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Attracting investments for renewing infrastructure, developing onshore 
gas activity or carbon capture and storage are just a few of the policy 
entries in the United Kingdom’s long list of priorities for enhancing the 
country’s energy security. With the expansion of onshore wind farms 
and the Westminster government’s stance in favour of growing a UK 
unconventional gas industry, this country seems set to grow more 
onshore energy projects despite the resistance of local communities and 
a vocal anti-fracking public opinion. Closer to Aberdeen, onshore energy 
infrastructures and their impact on the local scenery continue to feed 
much heated debate as to their compliance with local planning policies 
and the Scottish nation’s sustainability objectives. 
At Robert Gordon University, part of our teaching and research directly 
connects with these energy policy issues. In order to contribute to this 
stream of ideas, and as part of the Law School’s 2013 programme of 
events, the Aberdeen Business School sponsored in November 2013 a 
two-day conference discussing “Energy Projects and the Social License 
of Energy Project in Scotland”. This booklet brings you seven of our 
keynote speakers’s presentations in a transcript reflecting how these were 
delivered during the conference. A number of circumstances prevented 
us from publishing this digest at an earlier date but it truly is a pleasure to 
be able to release these transcripts now as I am sure you will appreciate 
the significance of the views expressed and the scholarship and expertise 
of our keynote speakers from Denmark, England and Scotland. We have 
not compiled the keynotes in the same order as the one that was followed 
for their presentations at the conference but they have been slightly 
reorganised in an attempt to create a greater dynamic between the views 
and topics discussed. We hope that our readers will find this approach 
useful to help them better appreciate the conclusions expressed.
We begin this series of transcripts by Mr Mark Lappin’s keynote 
discussing the 2013 real-life profile of the UK’s energy supply and 
demand. Mr Lappin introduced our delegates to the UK’s live energy 
data available on the internet showing the country’s power production 
and requirements. As a geologist with decades of experience of oil 
and gas industry management, Mr Lappin is an onshore exploration 
and production engineer with a rare expertise in unconventional gas in 
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Scotland. The live energy data accessible via the National Grid’s website 
helped Mr Lappin comment on the strategic role of natural gas for the 
production of UK electricity. In 2013 the UK remained strikingly reliant on 
fossil fuels for generating its baseload. Coal still produced 20% of all UK 
electricity. Mark Lappin argued the importance in this context of creating 
a regulatory environment that promotes UK domestic gas resources 
while the country transitions its energy system to include a larger share 
of renewables. Gas being less potent than coal this policy should include 
a long-term vision for natural gas, especially onshore gas, acceptance of 
which by local communities lies at the heart of a successful development 
of unconventional gas. Mr Lappin also indicated that natural gas could 
be a proper means of reducing carbon emissions while relying on a form 
of energy that is more flexible than many others. A natural gas strategy 
requires however that public and private energy stakeholders look at 
more effective ways of engaging with the public, especially if they want 
to alleviate resistance around onshore gas prospects. In Mr Lappin’s 
experience, regulatory frameworks should certainly help create more 
certainty but also provide a solid environment for public engagement. 
In the second keynote, Mr Robert Gray, who is Aberdeenshire’s Head of 
Planning and Building Standards, discusses the sources of opposition to 
onshore energy projects. He indicated that addressing opposition calls 
for an ability to identify a number of factors that are being perceived 
as “polluting” by local populations. Mr Gray discussed the challenges 
raised by the targets defining the Scottish ambition for renewable energy 
sources (RES). He thus questioned whether in 2013 planning regulators 
in Scotland did hold the policy instruments that help address the concerns 
that classically come with onshore projects. In that respect, Mr Gray 
questioned why the Scottish planning process seems now to be regarded 
as a “natural platform” for engaging with local communities on community 
benefits. He pointed that it is not part of the planning authority’s role to 
be involved or sanction the inclusion of community packages in onshore 
projects. Closing his presentation, Mr Gray also asked why in 2013 
Aberdeenshire there was still a visibly low level of community-owned 
infrastructure, especially for wind energy? As a planning expert Mr Gray 
concluded that in 2013 one could see a degree of disconnect between 
the Scottish RES ambition and the capacity of policy instruments to deliver 
a higher RES capacity, including for community energy.
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And when it comes to communities and energy infrastructure, Denmark 
is one of the few European Member States that have achieved startling 
results in building an onshore energy infrastructure backed by a broad 
social licence. To review the contemporary Danish environment, we had 
the privilege of welcoming Professor Anita Rønne from the University of 
Copenhagen. Professor Rønne helped the conference form a better sense 
of long-term policy visions and the efficiency of long-term planning and 
ambitions. In her first presentation to the conference, Professor Rønne 
explained how the success of Denmark’s onshore RES infrastructure 
owes to the Danish culture of political consensus over the country’s 
energy policy. Both of Professor Rønne’s presentations insisted on 
the need to think in terms of bespoke policy techniques and contents. 
The Danish energy strategy was introduced over 40 years ago. It has 
progressively helped Denmark build a world-class wind energy industry 
and infrastructure resting on a strong tradition of consultation with local 
populations. In practice, citizens are actively involved in public hearings 
and consultations. They are also invited to co-invest in wind farm projects. 
Consulting with local communities was perhaps initially perceived as 
burdensome. Yet, public consultations have gradually strengthened the 
efficiency of the planning process as it is now locally organised by the 
Danish municipalities. The contents and structure of the consultation 
process are also the result of a crossbreed between the Danish local and 
national experience. They have led the government to introduce policy 
instrument to compensate local communities and a scrapping scheme for 
replacing older wind farms. Loss of property value schemes also exist. 
These policies have enhanced the planning process’s efficiency by giving 
due consideration to local priorities as these effectively condition the rise 
of a social license around proposed development projects. 
In her presentation on day two, Professor Rønne’s shared her insight 
on Denmark’s policy for onshore shale gas. She discussed some of 
the regulatory adjustments that could be required for shale gas. Even 
if Denmark already had a comprehensive onshore exploration and 
production framework in place, the regulator resolved to impose 
additional environmental impact assessment (EIA) requirements. Anita 
Rønne discussed the impact of these new EIA requirements. She pointed 
out that this process had actually reinforced public participation and 
added to the Danish municipalities’ permitting role. Professor Rønne also 
touched on several of the Danish lessons learnt around social license 
on a land which has an extensive experienced in licensing onshore 
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installations. As regards shale gas it appeared in 2013 that licensing 
for fracking would reflect the country’s consensus-based approach. 
Decisions on shale gas exploration and production would be set to 
remain local and reflect a full consideration of populations through the 
consultations organised by the Danish municipalities.
Dr David Toke, from the University of Aberdeen, took the conference’s 
attention back to the UK’s energy framework. He first discussed several 
aspects of the UK’s nuclear policy. When reading energy policy, David 
Toke’s methodology includes taking a holistic approach. He chose to 
discuss issues of community benefits and energy community as part of 
his reading of the UK’s energy market reform. The views you will find 
reflected in Dr Toke’s transcript were evidently grounded on the UK 
policy context as it existed prior to November 2013, when the conference 
took place. Dr Toke therefore questioned why in 2013 Britain, policy 
instruments appeared to be insufficiently capable of achieving a greater 
expansion of RES in Britain. The country’s RES development appeared to 
be inconsistent with the UK’s energy policy instruments and their in-built 
technical capacity to deliver more infrastructure. On community benefits, 
David Toke demonstrated how, based on his own experience with RES, 
such benefits should go to the people located the closest to the wind 
farms. He illustrated his point by also referring to Denmark and the Hvide 
Sande wind farm project that does help demonstrate how an on-shore 
local success in community-owned RES infrastructure can also deliver 
some very substantial benefits to local communities. Dr Toke’s conclusion 
on community involvement comforted what we had also heard about 
Denmark i.e. that the citizens’ perception of energy infrastructures and 
their proposed deployment should significantly inspire the shaping of 
regulatory frameworks.
Identifying and exploring the citizens’ perception of the UK’s future 
energy system happens to be an area of research for scholars in human 
geography. Dr Karen Parkhill is a UK expert in this field. Recently, she 
worked extensively on the values that the British public say should be 
shaping our future energy system. Dr Parkhill’s presentation focused on 
one of her recent research project named “Transforming the UK’s Energy 
System”. She presented the core conclusions of this project which was 
also sponsored by the UK Energy Research Centre. Karen Parkhill’s 
research objectives included identifying the values that members of the 
public think should inspire the structuring of the UK’s future energy 
5
system. Her team included researchers active in multiple academic 
areas. This breadth of expertise explains the sophistication of the final 
report and its scientific findings. Dr Parkhill notably explained that 
“sustainability” and the concepts that help characterize it now appear to 
be firmly established in the British public’s mindset. “Sustainability” also 
comes with values such as “autonomy” and “power”. They both indicate 
that today’s residents of Britain expect to be able to better monitor their 
energy supply and manage their relationship with energy suppliers. 
Dr Parkhill also discussed how this value system has implications for 
community energy and how it should inspire regulators.
Going back to black letter law and the UK oil and gas framework, the 
next academic speaker who shared his reading of the UK regulatory 
framework for onshore energy projects was Mr Greg Gordon. Mr Gordon 
is a senior lecturer in energy law at the University of Aberdeen. By the 
time of the conference in 2013, the UK government had just made some 
important announcements designed to encourage shale gas activity in 
the UK. Mr Gordon commented on some of the challenges raised by 
the prospect of seeing an onshore unconventional gas industry emerge 
in the UK. He reviewed some of the 2013 regulatory changes while 
explaining the offshore and onshore licensing regime. He showed where 
fracking would bring some specific challenges to regulators, especially 
for defining an approach towards local communities. Our guest speaker 
stressed the need to come up with clearer and simpler regulations even 
though they should also be capable of addressing multiple needs and 
expectations. Therefore if the regulatory framework for onshore shale gas 
should help create more certainty for investors it should also enhance, 
by means of transparency, the public’s awareness and understanding of 
fracking projects. Mr Gordon also discussed whether the profit-sharing 
innovations the government had introduced in 2013 with other regulatory 
instruments could induce more community acceptance of unconventional 
gas in Britain. At the time of his keynote, Mr Gordon insisted that it was 
certainly too early to provide a final assessment of these recent regulatory 
initiatives. Yet, and considering community energy, Mr Gordon stressed 
that communities should not be invited too soon to develop projects 
around shale gas considering this industry’s very fluctuating business 
environment. Nevertheless, enhancing public trust around fracking could 
come from an express requirement to provide community packages 
that do reflect local conditions and concerns. Benefits packages should 
thus not be limited to a sharing of profits if they want to be regarded 
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as meeting local communities’ expectations. And if UK policy makers 
wanted to be truly innovative, community benefits could for instance 
include a firm commitment from the UK government that it will act as a 
guarantor towards local communities, should there be a need to provide a 
better coverage or remediation measures against the local risks that could 
be associated with any proposed shale gas project.
This series of keynotes closes with the transcript of Professor Peter 
Strachan’s contribution. As a professor at Robert Gordon University for 
over 20 years, Peter Strachan has been researching on RES deployment 
and the Scottish local governments’ policies for developing a low carbon 
economy. Professor Strachan’s research has led him to grow an expertise 
on social license issues in Scotland. He opened his presentation by 
stressing the significance of the role played by local governments in 
RES policies for Scotland. He showed, however, that despite a very 
significant ambition for RES deployment, there has been very little, if any, 
coordinated approach in Scotland to encourage community benefits. This 
reality is not a feature specific to Scotland. It also comes with several of 
the other classical issues raised by structuring community benefits, such 
as identifying the “community” at stake or defining the investments or 
amounts that developers should assign to community benefits. Professor 
Strachan’s research has revealed a lack of collaborative thinking around 
community benefits. He highlighted how developing a more coordinated 
approach should actually prove beneficial to achieve more onshore RES 
across Scotland. One of his final suggestions included identifying areas of 
action. He discussed the instruments that could help support community 
benefits, whether required by regulation or local practice. Reflecting 
on Mr Gray’s earlier presentation, Professor Strachan shared the view 
that the planning process should not be regarded as a framework 
predestined for assessing community benefits packaging, gauging of their 
existence or compliance. Local governments should not assume that the 
planning process provides an off-the-shelf environment for discussing 
community benefits. Professor Strachan also suggested that a good way 
to start making progress in Scotland towards a nation-wide approach to 
community benefits could be to initiate a regulatory review of the best 
practices observed so far in Scotland, in the Highland Council or, for 
instance, Argyll and Bute.
During these two days of conference we felt immensely privileged to 
host this intellectual platform discussing the rarely approached issues of 
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social license, community benefits and energy projects. Here, I would like 
to commend again each of our key note speakers for their extraordinary 
work, their time and thought-provoking contributions. I wish to our 
readers the same enjoyment and stimulation when reflecting on our 
speakers’ presentations and the many suggestions they brought forward. 
In the transcripts, we have sought to maintain the original version of our 
keynote speakers’ spoken words. We took this approach as a matter 
of authenticity, in an effort to reflect the personal tone put into each 
contribution. Let me finally thank each of our guest speakers for kindly 
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Mark Lappin is geologist by background. At our energy policy 
conference, Mr Lappin shared his views on the UK’s energy mix and 
energy security issues. This initial picture helped draw the real-life 
backdrop to power supply in the UK. Mark Lappin’s experience as 
project manager of multiple onshore projects in continental Europe 
and the UK provided some first-hand information on the approach 
for communicating with local communities and the importance of 
engaging them around upstream projects. Onshore natural gas 
projects should now be considered in light of this backdrop and 
consider community benefits.
Understanding the need for improved community engagement 
concerning energy projects in the UK is closely linked to an accurate 
understanding of the energy consumption by UK customers. The 
constant strain on supplies confirms the interdependence of energy 
and society. It makes the future of energy exploration and production a 
challenge that rests on embracing its direct and indirect stakeholders’ 
acceptance of energy projects and therefore questions how to best 
approach the issue of social licence to operate. 
The need to develop onshore upstream activities is connected to a 
number of developments which have recently shaped the structure of 
demand and energy production in the UK.
In that respect, the UK’s National Grid Status on-line live feeds helps 
understand the trend and profile of the UK’s power supply and demand.1 
At the time of the conference, in November 2013, the National Grid’s on-
line live feed was showing that the UK’s total demand culminated to 44 
gigawatts (GW), out of which: 
• 15 GW came from coal – typically, coal is the highest single 
contribution.
• 7.7 GW came from nuclear – nuclear remained a very steady source 
of energy. 
1 The UK’s National Grid Status can be followed by clicking on the following 
address: <http://www.gridwatch.templar.co.uk/>
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• 13.6 GW was supplied by gas – unlike nuclear, the amount of energy 
supplied from gas varies significantly as gas is flexible and is used to 
respond to peaks and troughs.
• 4.6 GW came from wind – but ¬wind remains intermittent. The share 
of this renewable source of energy in the UK has grown enormously 
in terms of a relative and year-on-year growth.
 
These numbers reflect the contribution to the National Grid. For 
renewables such as wind and solar the National Grid’s live feed does not 
include the energy coming from independent wind turbines and private 
solar generation. These actually account for very little. 
Such a breakdown confirms that the UK needs a balanced energy mix 
so that this country may enjoy the benefits of all the different sources 
of energy. This mix may not create a perfect answer in terms of carbon 
footprint, but it addresses the energy policy trilemma, i.e. providing 
secure, affordable and low carbon energy. Today, no single energy source 
can address all of those priorities. Offshore natural gas, unconventional 
gas, wind power, nuclear are no standalone solution. A combination of 
these energy sources can provide an answer but the challenge for the UK 
is to identify how to make such a combination work. The UK’s diverse 
energy mix is also needed to provide a sustained and flexible supply of 
power. 
The National Grid’s data introduced a moment ago help appreciate the 
UK’s day by day power demand. The typical “week in power” shows that 
each night the UK’s energy demand drops by about 25 to 30%. During 
the day, energy levels rise again to provide power for business and 
production. Towards the end of the day, the energy demand rises and 
fluctuates as some businesses are still running and people go home to 
switch their lights, cookers, television sets and other appliances. The UK’s 
picture is quite interesting when it comes to coal as this resource is being 
used to supply the base load. It has the highest carbon footprint but right 
now coal is the most affordable source of energy. Coal certainly helps 
cover the seasonal variations and is used at various points across seasons. 
It is also important to look at the timing data and see how demand spreads 
over a year. Here again, the data sourced from the National Grid help 
understand the power outputs variations over weeks, weekends, or over 
several years - and at any given day over several years. For instance, the 
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data makes it possible to understand the energy demand breakdown say, 
at seven o’clock, every Thursday over several years. This analysis reveals 
that, depending on the season, coal is the source of energy that is most 
capable of responding to seasonality and weather variations. Natural gas 
provides energy for short-term power needs. Nuclear remains steady 
within a standard seven to eight-gigawatt output. Wind remains marginal 
as the UK is still in the initial phase of this technology.
Overtime, if we also consider the UK’s breakdown of power sources, 
we can see the huge drop in coal consumption from the 1950s onwards. 
Coal dropped while oil and, then, gas consumption increased. Then the 
beginning of the 1990s was marked by a “dash for gas”. Gas and coal 
switched, essentially replacing each other throughout a period that was 
marked by a big decline of reserves in the North Sea. In 2011, the UK 
used 40% of gas and 30% of coal in its energy mix. In 2012, within one 
year, the data changed to 40% of coal and 30% of gas. This historical 
one-year switch was partly due to coal becoming cheaper as the USA is 
still producing a lot of coal. The price of coal went down, and in terms of 
transportation it is easier to ship coal than to load gas in a LNG tanker. So 
consumer countries have been burning more coal and caused a switch in 
their energy mixes. The price of gas is also going down as North America 
is developing its shale gas. 
Yet, for the UK, the challenge to design an affordable energy mix should 
also help meet the prospect of reducing carbon emissions. Currently, 
the massive presence of coal in the UK cannot be simply justified by this 
resource becoming “cheaper”. In that respect, developing our onshore 
natural gas appears to be part of the UK government’s strategy for a less 
carbon-intensive energy mix.2 The UK must be able to show that it can 
move forward on shale gas by building its own track record. Today, we 
can hear concerns which are similar to those voiced about the North Sea 
a number of years ago: “the supply chain will be a major hurdle”; “the 
North Sea is not like the Gulf of Mexico” or even Texas, etc. Yet, the UK 
is certainly well placed to lead in Europe for the development of this 
resource.
2 In Europe, there have been attempts to further explore onshore gas since the 
1990s. In the USA coal bed methane has been representing about 8% of the 
country’s domestic gas production since the 1980s.
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Concerns over shale gas in the UK can be overcome through an effective 
public engagement. The big difference between the UK and the US is 
that shale gas was established in America before shale gas became what 
people believe it to be today. The UK’s stakeholders look at the pros 
and cons of unconventional by comparing these resources’ prospects to 
what is perceived to have happened in North America. However, the UK 
is not America. The UK territory is not the same as the one in America 
and this is why there is a real need to build a local track record. This 
country has also a strict, transparent licensing regime and strong rules 
and regulations for corporations, environmental and business matters. 
The UK has also recently progressed on community engagement. 
One of the keys to a successful community engagement is through the 
planning process. Engaging early and being actively involved in this 
dialogue with communities are essential requirements. Strictly following 
statutory guidelines is not good enough. When promoting local benefits 
and talking to communities, operators should make sure they do not just 
focus on monetary benefits to the community. Experience reveals that 
monetary benefits are as divisive as they can be helpful. The operator’s 
communication also needs to rest on simple messages. One of them is 
certainly that, the UK needs gas for its energy security. 
As of today, none of the elements of the UK’s energy mix can provide a 
reliable, affordable, low carbon energy supply. As discussed, the UK’s 
energy security rests on the proper balancing of its energy sources and 
fuels. But, how will the country decide where the balance lies? How will 
the UK decide what its energy mix should look like? Typically markets 
are not very good at making strategic choices for the long term. So that 
means that these choices rest on government. This is where decisions 
on long-term choices get very challenging. Building policies for the 
UK’s energy mix is very difficult as it entails making complex choices. 
These choices will almost instantly trigger dislikes by a proportion of 
the population. It makes the exercise of balancing the energy mix very 
difficult. Yet, a new domestic supply of gas would have an impact on the 
UK’s energy mix, the UK’s security of supply and jobs. With the North 
Sea supply of gas now in decline, and after forty years and some £300 
billion of tax revenue, the UK has many challenges to overcome. As far 
as onshore natural gas is concerned, the UK also owes it to itself to know 
how much the resource is before this country can decide how to offset 






Robert Gray is Head of Planning and Building Standards for 
Aberdeenshire. Mr Gray brought to the conference his professional 
vision on the Scottish planning policies and the wind turbine 
developments taking place in Aberdeenshire. His professional insight 
also led Mr Gray to comment on selected aspects of community 
benefits by showing how a certain degree of disconnection between 
policies and instruments can act as a barrier against the development 
of more locally-owned wind energy projects in Aberdeenshire.
National Targets – Local Policies
It is important to highlight a number of disconnects between targets and 
policy. Indeed, one historical feature of the Scottish renewable energy 
policy that should be acknowledged and kept in mind is the disconnect 
between what Scotland is trying to achieve in terms of renewable energy 
and the way renewable energy developments are being assessed on 
the ground. There is also a disconnect between community benefit 
aspirations and the way these benefits funds have been structured.
History and Background
History, however, should also remind us of Aberdeenshire’s local 
interest for wind power and electricity. It is now established that in 1888 
an American, Charles F. Brush, created a turbine turning wind energy 
into electricity. Charles F. Brush was thus believed to be one of the first 
persons ever to have done so. Yet, a native of Aberdeenshire called 
James Blyth, who became professor at the Anderson Institute in Glasgow 
(a precursor of Strathclyde University) produced a wind turbine in his 
garden in Aberdeenshire in the summer of 1887, which makes him the 
first person to have produced electricity from wind. One of his turbines 
also generated the backup electricity supply for the Infirmary in Montrose 
and operated for 30 years.
Today, the typical wind farm infrastructure’s profile in Aberdeenshire 
is made up of a single, two or three turbines of approximately 80 to 
100-meter high. There are also farms consisting of groups of eight or 
nine turbines connected to the grid. The challenges put by wind farms 
to planning authorities includes sanctioning renewable energy projects 
which conflict with historical and natural environments. These choices 
make decisions difficult over the way land should be used and the 
activities that the planning authority will allow or refuse.
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Targets
There are a number of targets for renewables. At the time of the 
conference, the European target was 20% of energy from renewables by 
2020. For the UK, the target was 15% of energy from renewables by 2020. 
The Scottish government’s target has been to generate 100% of electricity 
from renewables by 2020. There is a small difference here as the Scottish 
target has moved from 100% “energy” to “electricity”. Electricity is much 
more achievable if it is used as a target. The target has also been set to 
50% by 2015, and in 2011 Scotland was up to 31%. Scotland as a whole 
will therefore probably achieve that target by 2015.
There is no target for security of supply. As the world is getting more 
and more unstable, security of supply should remain the core focus. 
The deployment of renewable energy sources in Scotland might help 
achieve a greater level of security of supply. Looking at the 2020 Scottish 
targets on renewables for electricity (100%) and heat (11%), and also 500 
MW of renewables generated through local communities, thus raises 
the question as to how these targets relate to each and how they could 
be achieved. In terms of modes of energy consumption, getting near or 
achieving 100% of electricity from renewable energy sources does not 
appear to be too much of an impossible target. The challenges lie, more 
likely, with heat and transportation. Scotland being a cold region, the end 
consumers consumes a lot of heat.
In Aberdeenshire, the planning authority is looking at the area being 
“carbon neutral” by 2030. This region represents around 10% of 
Scotland’s area and achieving carbon neutrality is an extremely 
demanding target. To work towards this neutrality, there is a hierarchy 
of environmental policies. This hierarchy begins with the Scottish 
government in the National Planning Framework (NPF) and the Scottish 
Planning Policy document. These documents set targets and also define 
how the decision-making process should function in relation to those 
issues. The Scottish government’s plan impacted on the Aberdeen City 
and Shire Strategic Development Plan, defining how Aberdeen City and 
the Aberdeenshire Council would be working together while aiming at 
achieving the objectives together. Each of the two authorities produced a 
Local Development Plan. These plans identify what can or will happen on 
the various sites in the area. This document is also supplemented by some 
guidances and advices which have a lower regulatory status.
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Policy
The Scottish Planning Policy on renewables is centred around seven 
points. They have been designed in order to achieve the Scottish and 
National renewable targets and could lead to some greater national 
security of energy supply. 
These seven points are used in deciding whether onshore turbines will 
be approved or not. One of the NPF targets is to make Peterhead, in 
Aberdeenshire, a hub for receiving and marketing offshore-generated 
wind electricity. Combined with tide and hydro-electricity, the Scottish 
offshore wind electricity capacity could ultimately provide an important 
part of the mix of electricity generation. Peterhead is also targeted to 
become a pilot site for carbon capture and storage. The NPF from the 
Scottish government includes reinforcing the grid at Peterhead from 
75 kW to 400 kW. On the ground, pylons were initially constructed to 
accommodate 400 kW and there is little environmental impact.
At the time of the conference, a new policy instrument for wind 
energy named the “Strategic Landscape Capacity Assessment for 
Wind Energy” was under consultation and about to be introduced in 
Aberdeenshire. The approach followed in this new instrument addresses 
the government’s issue in relation to planning authorities relying on 
instruments which rest on a variety of “criteria” for assessing projects. 
The government wants to favour instruments which are likely to provide 
more certainty to the industry. For instance, the new instrument defines 
areas where the capacity for new turbine infrastructure is likely to be or is 
already fully reached. It identifies development potential depending on 
the size of the proposed installation. This approach is expected to provide 
swifter answers to applicants by defining areas where projects are likely or 
not likely to obtain permission.
The preparatory studies that helped generate this instrument revealed 
that Aberdeenshire is already a pretty full area. This picture contrasts 
with the official message which still favours onshore wind for more 
deployment of renewables. Onshore wind may be cheaper than offshore 
wind, but the land and areas technically available for development have 
become rather limited. Yet, the interest in the region as a wind turbine 
province has increased and created a surge in planning applications. 
Investors have lodged more than 1,000 planning applications in the last 
3 years for multiple turbines. In total 933 individual wind turbines have 
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been approved in Aberdeenshire - out of which approximately 300 are 
constructed. Today there are 114 pending planning applications which 
equate to 181 individual wind turbines.
Process
The planning authority acts as the gatekeeper in Aberdeenshire. 
Accordingly, interested investors must lodge a planning application for 
wind turbine developments with this authority. The process requires the 
planning authority to consider the existing policies set forth in the national 
policies discussed above, followed by the guidance and additional 
material produced locally. Additional material considerations may also 
need to be taken on board prior to making any decisions.
The process also requires consulting a large number of bodies. It tends to 
lead observers to state that planning is a very slow process. For a turbine 
application, the number of consultees can reach 40 to 50 and involve a 
wide range of inputs.
The planning authority also posts public announcements about planning 
applications in the local newspapers and notifies neighbours. Interested 
parties who object against the project are entitled to come forward 
and express their objections to the authority. Prior to the decision, the 
planning authorities indicate in a report whether the turbine application 
should be approved or refused. 
The final decision comes from elected area committees. Aberdeenshire 
comprises six area committees. Each area has its own geography and 
natural and economic profile. Identical projects may be authorised by one 
area committee and another area committee may refuse depending on 
differing local circumstances. Such variations in approval and outcomes 
may result in a level of uncertainty for the renewable energy industry.
The assessment criteria for planning decisions in Aberdeenshire are 
available in a document called “Guidelines for Landscape and Visual 
Impact Assessment.” 
Due to the variety of existing environments and landscapes, the 
views expressed on the proposed developments cannot be assessed 
according to a single uniform pattern. An area like the land around Banff 
and McDuff illustrates how identifying suitable spots for wind farms 
developments can be challenging. This area is not very densely populated 
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and would seem to offer a wide open space for development. Due to this 
apparent large availability of land, investors and other interested parties 
have been hoping that this territory would be suitable for installing a large 
number of wind farms. The land has, however, been intensely farmed for 
centuries and all the houses built on this land are still occupied and spread 
fairly evenly across the land surface. Unlike what would appear at first 
sight, there is no wide, unoccupied and open space available for installing 
large wind farms or “a-turbine-at-each-and-every-kilometre”. Therefore, 
the planning authority has to assess applications for wind turbines which, 
despite the size of the land, will almost always affect someone locally.
Similarly, if a body such as the Ministry of Defence opposes to the 
development because it interferes with radar, the planning authority will 
issue a refusal. 
The opposition to projects may also come from interested parties who 
object to the proposed wind turbines because they may spoil a view that 
they “used to enjoy”. The Aberdeenshire planning authority will address 
such concerns by referring to its aforementioned guidelines on visual and 
landscape impact. Technically, the planning authority assesses the visual 
impact of wind farms through computer-generated visual assessments. 
This device helps identify the areas from where the wind-turbines are 
visible. These vulnerable areas include houses, villages, hill tops used as 
recreational areas for tourism and hill-walking. In addition, the assessment 
procedure requires assessing the impact of the noise associated with 
wind turbines. In practice, investigating the noise impact is a very time-
consuming project. It requires measuring the background noise, the noise 
generated by the turbines under different conditions and the cumulative 
impact on the built and the non-built environment. These tests help 
identify if installations reach acceptable levels of noise for people to live 
with them.
Community Benefits
So, how do the Scottish targets on renewables fit with issues of 
community benefits?
Well…first and foremost, the planning authority observes a strict policy 
of non-involvement in community benefits that may be negotiated as 
part of wind turbine developments. These questions should neither 
interfere with nor affect the judgement and recommendations issued by 
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the planning authority. Acting as the gatekeeper, the planning authority 
is bound to ignore negotiations or dealings around community benefits 
in order to keep all interested parties on a level playing field. The 
Aberdeenshire Council has, however, appointed a person whose role is 
precisely to assist communities to make money out of renewable energy. 
The role of the Aberdeenshire planning authority and the role of this 
person are however kept completely separate.
In terms of community-owned wind farms in the area, the Aberdeenshire 
Council received in November 2013 a Scottish National Renewable 
Energy League award for wind energy projects providing money for 
communities and local groups. Aberdeenshire, however, remains behind 
the high figures reached in some of continental Europe’s countries. In 
Germany approximately 50% of the wind farms are community-owned. 
In Denmark this figure goes up to 85%. The largest community owned 
wind farm in Aberdeenshire is called Tullo Wind Farm and has a capacity 
of 17 MW. This wind farm is located near Stonehaven and owned by 
Eneco UK, the British arm of an independent Dutch energy company 
in the form of a cooperative of 53 Dutch municipalities. The Tullo 
Wind Farm generates an income of £2 million per annum for the Dutch 
municipalities and only £17,000 go to the local community as benefits. 
Evidently, this Scottish success was built on a foreign investors’ money. 
So the question arises, why locally-grown projects do not attract more of 
the local population’s interest? Part of this question could be answered by 
promoting more of the existing community ownership schemes. These 
include ownership structures such as co-operative models. Cooperatives 
have been successfully tested in Aberdeenshire in places like Boyndie, 
an old airfield on the northern coast near Banff. This wind farm required 
a £10 to £15-million investment. The co-operative is 716 members strong 
and individual investments ranged from £260 to £20,000. The money 
generated by the wind turbine is going back to the community. This 
revenue has helped finance public infrastructure that the council could 
not finance directly. It also gives control to the local community over the 
type of infra
The “Fintry Model” is another successful form of community-owned wind 
farm tested on the Campsie Fells hills between Stirling and Glasgow. 
Under this model, the local community will own one turbine within the 
larger group of wind turbines that makes the wind farm. Scotland has also 
tested the “Udny Community Model”, where the local community solely 
finances and erects one single wind turbine.
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The Scottish government provides loan schemes for landowners and 
community wind projects. The “CARES” loan schemes provide £10,000 
per installed megawatt. The loan money can also be used for pre-
planning costs of development. These schemes should hopefully invite 
communities in the North East of Scotland to be more resilient to consider 
bigger projects for wind energy development. They should also help 
community realise that by investing in wind farms they will reap the 
benefit as they will be consuming a green and cheap form of energy.
Conclusion
The North East of Scotland is evidently one of the windiest places in the 
UK and Europe. It has built a significant expertise from earlier wind farm 
development projects. More progress could be achieved by creating 
better connections between targets, policies, assessment methods, and 
community benefits. There is also a growing need to better connect the 
various models of wind farm projects to help local communities invest 







First presentation delivered on day one of the conference
1. Background to Denmark’s energy policy
The oil crisis of the 1970s can still help explain the contemporary Danish 
energy policy. At the time, Denmark was up to 99% dependent on 
hydrocarbons imports. This situation had a severe impact on Danish 
society. Politicians realised that a lot had to be done to change the 
country’s external dependence. A first initiative was to start exploration 
and production of hydrocarbons under Danish sovereignty in the North 
Sea. Luckily, Denmark was quite successful. By 1997, the country became 
self-sufficient not only in oil but also in energy. In 2005, the production 
of indigenous resources in Denmark was 58% higher than the country’s 
energy consumption. Today, Denmark is the only European country out 
of 28 member states to be self-sufficient. This situation will, however, 
not last. Production seems to have peaked. In that respect, Denmark is 
facing the same challenge as the UK. According to the national forecasts, 
production of oil and gas should meet the Danish energy consumption 
needs into the 2020s. Denmark is therefore at a time of crucial decisions, 
including on shale gas.
2. Energy planning and energy policies in Denmark
Planning and designing policies on energy have been two top priorities 
in Denmark since the 1970s. The first energy plan dates back to 1976. 
Since then the country has carried out several series of energy plans. 
Their top priorities not only focused on the exploration and production of 
hydrocarbons but also the development of the wind turbine industry.
Denmark built a national gas grid infrastructure in operation as of 1984. 
It also implemented a comprehensive heat planning system to make sure 
that the country could make use of its natural gas.
There were a number of important developments throughout the 70s and 
the 80s, including the creation of an institutional framework for regulation 
of the energy sector. From the mid- 1990s the times were marked by 
the liberalisation of the energy sector and throughout the course of the 
following 15 years, by considerations relating to climate change which 
was high on the political agenda. In 2011 Denmark adopted its latest 
governmental energy plan. It got supplemented in August 2013 by a 
special climate policy plan which introduced 80 new initiatives and policy 
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instruments.3 Denmark’s target is to reach 35% of renewable energy in its 
gross energy consumption by 2020. The country also wishes to be 100% 
fossil fuel-free by 2050. These targets are less stringent than the one set 
for Scotland. They remain, however, very ambitious considering that 
Denmark does not have any hydroenergy at all. Denmark is connected to 
the electricity systems of Sweden, Norway and Germany, but Denmark 
also does not either maintain any nuclear plant.
3. The energy transition
An ambitious energy transition process is taking place across the 
European Union and Denmark is also carrying out its transition. 
In terms of political process, the Danish tradition is to rely on consensus. 
It means that the government prepares a policy plan and then starts 
negotiations with the various parties sitting in the Danish Parliament. 
The results of this process provide a very stable policy framework for the 
future. Technically, the political agreements become enforceable by being 
transcribed into the law.
It provides a clear, long-term vision which now focuses on a low-carbon 
future. It also prevents energy developments, investments and priorities 
from being impacted by politics and changes in government. Elections 
take place in Denmark at least every four years.
The latest political agreement of March 2012 contains statements in 
favour of the Danish “passion for wind.” It spelt out policies in support of 
offshore, nearshore and onshore wind energy. It also introduced a cap on 
high electricity prices in order to avoid overcompensation of wind energy 
projects. 
Danish policy-makers are continuously willing to invest in more research 
and develop new technologies. In the future, heat should be increasingly 
sourced from renewables. New laws will also prohibit new buildings from 
relying on heat coming from sources other than renewables.
3The IPCCC’s findings published in its latest assessment reports confirms that it is 
now even clearer that human activity has been the central reason for the recent 
global warming. Such a confirmation must be seriously taken into consideration for 
the future course of energy policies.
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Denmark is therefore moving along with a firm plan that sets mandatory 
rules and standards. This approach is not the one of a strictly free-market 
economy but shows characteristics typically associated with planned and 
directed development.
In this environment, wind energy will retain its historical and central 
role. Next to it, solar energy has proven to be very popular. The success 
reached by solar generators actually led the government to remove 
subsidies introduced in the past to support investments in this form of 
renewable energy. Biogas is also scheduled to be a growing source of 
energy.
Denmark was one of the early pioneers of wind energy. It was Denmark’s 
chance to be one of the early starters of wind energy as there was not 
much competition at the time on this market. The country found it 
possible to turn this industry segment into a viable business. Denmark 
started to export large volumes of wind turbines. Today, there is much 
more competition on this market. If the market share of Denmark has 
decreased, it still holds 15 % of the world market.
The massive deployment of wind energy in Denmark is also the reflection 
of a successful “bottom-up approach.” This achievement is the result of 
an early involvement of people and communities, and this approach has 
also been applied to some of the recent wind initiatives.
In offshore wind, Denmark can boast 20 years of industrial experience. A 
proper planning policy has proven to be very important in this success. 
This efficiency transpired in the 2007 strategic report which identified the 
best locations for wind turbines in the future. Some areas are protected 
land, or identified as zones where the fishing industry strongly rejects 
erections of wind farms. Offshore wind turbines still attract more projects. 
The most recent ones (Horns Rev 1 and Horns Rev 2) involve two long-
distance offshore wind farms developments , 15 and 34 km away from the 
shores.
This new wind energy, however, raises a technical challenge. It requires 
integrating the power to the grid which will be generated by this new 
capacity. Denmark already goes through cycles of over and under-
production. The forecast for improvement in that respect is not very 
good. There is therefore a lot of research in order to identify how to make 
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the grid more efficient and have an impact on consumption. Building a 
smart grid industry is the next business development target for Denmark. 
This new expertise will not only serve Denmark’s needs to integrate all 
the energy from renewables but also give it a competitive advantage.
4. Challenges associated with wind turbines developments
The first challenge is to be able to grow the country’s wind turbine 
capacity.
Local resistance against wind turbines exists and comes from property 
owners and municipalities. Some of the best sites are already equipped 
with old generation turbines. These are not always very efficient and 
sometimes not suitably located within the landscape. So in order to 
make the removal of such turbines possible, Denmark has introduced a 
scrapping scheme. It enables removing old turbines and replacing them 
with more efficient, latest generation, turbines. Developers also receive 
some additional compensation for removing old turbines.
The government has also invested in a test site on land for mega turbines. 
Despite protests, the site is now operating and the industry is renting this 
facility from the government. Turbines up to 250 metres high will undergo 
testing there. The cost associated with onshore testing is, of course, much 
lower than when carrying out test operations offshore.
5. Specific approval process for onshore and offshore wind 
turbines: “siting”, planning and incentives
For siting, government approval procedures are distinct depending on 
whether the development will take place offshore or onshore. Offshore 
wind turbines receive approval from the Danish ministry of energy and 
climate who conducts all planning screening and grant the necessary 
permits. Strictly speaking, there is no existing planning framework for 
offshore developments. In practice, the ministry opens specific areas for 
tender, based on a number of site studies. At the time of the conference, 
the ministry had selected seven main, “first priority” areas and eleven 
“second priority” areas. In 2013, the ministry also retained six sites for 
nearshore development and the construction of wind turbines.
Onshore, the most important authorities are the municipalities. These 
authorities have jurisdiction over the local planning. The Danish Act 
on the Promotion of Renewable Energy has introduced a licensing 
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framework. Three forms of licences exist: one for carrying out preliminary 
investigations; one for establishing the windfarm; and one to generate 
wind power.
When a project is likely to have an environmental impact, applicants must 
carry out a specific environmental impact assessment. So far, all windfarm 
projects developed in Denmark had to carry out an environmental impact 
assessment. Licensing may be the result of two different procedures. 
One is a government-led tender process. The other is an open door 
procedure. At the heart of the tender process lies the question of the 
price at which the bidder is ready to produce electricity. In this process, 
the Danish Energy Agency acts as a one-stop shop. Investors are solely 
required to approach this agency which in turn liaises with all other 
interested government departments.
Nearshore energy projects also represent the new generation of onshore 
wind turbine projects in Denmark. Just like for onshore projects, 
nearshore developers are required to open 20% of the projected 
investment to municipalities and neighbouring citizens. In order to 
promote public acceptance of wind energy, Danish policymakers have 
introduced sophisticated policy instruments. These include specific 
planning laws whereby the government defines the national framework 
but the municipalities design the local planning rules which include 
specific conditions applying to wind farms. The planning process requires 
a high level of involvement and consultation with local communities. 
These may look time-consuming but they are actually vital to projects 
in order to secure their local acceptance. The regulatory instruments 
include a widespread use of: environmental impact assessment; citizens’ 
participation and dialogue; disclosure and information obligations. 
Denmark has also introduced specific legal requirements, rules and 
standards for wind farms. These define the minimum distance between 
installations and private dwellings4; maximum height of wind turbine5; 
4The minimum distance between a wind turbine and private dwelling cannot be 
less than four times the total height of the wind turbine.
5The Danish regulator seeks to limit the visual impact of wind farms as 
developments should have as little impact on the landscape as possible. On a 
single site, new developments will be considered along the same constraints as 
those imposed on pre-existing wind farms. In addition to restrictions on protected 
listed sites, wind turbines must also be erected in groups and at designated areas.
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and maximum noise emissions6. In addition, it also sets the guidelines for 
legal requirements including economic incentives for Danish citizens to 
invest in wind farm projects. Citizens residing close to proposed wind 
farms have an option to purchase wind turbine shares. They can also avail 
an option to get compensation for the loss of value to their property.
Developing new incentives and policy instruments is also an on-going 
process in Denmark. In addition to the 20% share ownership obligation7 
and the property compensation scheme mentioned above, there is a 
“green scheme” to financially reward municipalities that take positive 
planning steps in favour of wind farms. A state guarantee for bank loans is 
also available through a fund in order to finance preliminary investments 
in future wind farm projects.
6. Assessment
Assessing the foregoing instruments, whether they are “positive” or 
“negative”, is a difficult exercise. Developers are not always very keen 
on 20% of investment volatility to private citizens. Yet, experience shows 
that local communities tend to be more engaged towards proposed 
developments. Having local communities holding stakes is also part 
of the early history of wind farms development in Denmark. At the 
very beginning, local communities were the leading investors in first-
generation wind farms. So there is a long tradition in Denmark for 
community-funded or shared windfarm developments.
As for the compensation scheme, it reflects a pragmatic reality. It is 
difficult to argue that the close proximity of wind turbines to private 
dwellings does not have an impact on the value of those properties. So 
the question arises as to which party should bear this loss: should it be the 
property owner or the wind turbine developer? The Danish compensation 
6Noise emissions are limited to 42-44 dB in the open land. Further noise restrictions 
apply for densely populated areas.
7A 20% purchase option must be offered to all citizens living within less than 4.5 km 
of any proposed windfarm development. This 20% share usually sells out rapidly. 
In the event a portion of the share remains outstanding, developers are required to 
offer them to citizens of municipalities located beyond the minimum 4.5 km radius.
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scheme chose to put such a burden on the developer8. As a result, 
developers must organise public meetings to inform project neighbours 
of their compensation scheme’s terms and the 20% ownership scheme. To 
that effect, they must follow a process prescribed by law which requires 
publishing approved information material and making a number of public 
announcements.
This compensation scheme may be regarded as controversial because it 
focuses on the public’s attention on the nuisance associated with turbines 
and the wind industry - as opposed to focusing on benefits of this energy. 
The scheme also brings a certain level of economic uncertainty due to 
the confidentiality applying to property valuations and the impact of 
wind turbine projects. Several valuation decisions have been brought for 
review by the Danish courts and those jurisdictions have not necessarily 
followed the opinion of the valuators. On the positive side of things 
the scheme acts as an incentive for developers to propose projects 
which create a minimal impact on their environment. It presumably 
also helps mitigate the local resistance sometimes shown by citizens or 
municipalities.
So what has the Danish wind energy development helped learn? 
Experience has shown that a strong political will and consensus are 
absolutely vital for successful deployment of wind energy. There is a need 
to combine efficient planning, proper siting and public support policies. 
In addition, public information, awareness and financial incentives are 
equally important instruments.
 
8Where the property owner has contributed to the loss of value, the amount 
of compensation finally payable may be reduced. Such losses are assessed by 
a specific valuation authority. The procedure requires on-site visits to identify 






Second presentation delivered on day two of the conference
In her second contribution to the conference, Professor Rønne 
discussed the Danish approach and licensing policy towards 
unconventional gas.
1. Denmark and unconventional gas
Prior to focusing on the Danish position and its plans for shale gas 
exploration and production, it is important to look at it in a broader 
context, i.e., why is Denmark looking at licensing of shale gas and how 
shale gas is perceived in a more European context?
There is no doubt that the American experience with shale gas 
exploration has triggered an increasing interest for this resource in 
Europe. The huge volumes needed in the USA for energy consumption 
has led to America’s energy dependence. It is now widely reported 
that the United States have actually moved from being a major energy 
importing country to being capable of meeting its own energy needs. 
Consequently, the price of gas has fallen.
This situation has raised a good deal of interest for shale gas in Europe, 
and Denmark is no exception. On this side of the Atlantic, witnessing 
this dramatic change in the US energy scenario, poses the question 
as to whether it could be replicated in a country like Denmark. It 
was highlighted during the contribution delivered on day one of the 
conference, that Denmark is self-sufficient in oil and gas and energy 
supplies. The country is also already aware that its oil and gas production 
has peaked. Estimations for the country’s full coverage of domestic 
consumption from oil is 2020 - and for gas 2022. It is beyond doubt that 
it would be in the interest of Denmark if it could level out this time and 
forecast how the country could maintain its independence by covering its 
full demand in oil and gas for a longer time.
Looking now at the situation on the supply side in the wider European 
context, the energy picture is not in general as positive as I have just 
discussed. Europe is increasingly dependent on energy imports and 
its present dependence is in excess of 55%. Forecasts show that this 
dependence is on the rise especially with imports from regions that are 
politically unstable. There is therefore an issue of energy security. The 
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fluctuation of oil prices is a major issue and most experts forecast that oil 
prices may further rise. At the very least they are fluctuating. This gives 
a strong reason to support new exploration opportunities such as shale 
gas. When it comes to exploring shale gas, the European Union is at a 
relatively early stage and contrasts with the progress made in the United 
States. In fact, Europe does not know the amount of resources that it 
could explore and whether the figures reported by American sources and 
the media are true. At the time of the conference, there had not been 
much drilling yet in Europe and definitely not in Denmark.
It is also interesting to look at the situation of coal production and 
consumption in the United States. Figures show that both the production 
and consumption are going down. It is good news for the United States, 
as this trend has implications on CO2 emissions. Emissions have fallen 
so much that the United States could ratify the Kyoto protocol and fulfil 
the reduction targets specified in this protocol. What are the implications 
of this reduction in coal consumption by the USA on a global level? 
The USA is no longer relying on as much on coal as they used to in the 
past. As a result, coal export volumes are increasing. The global level of 
CO2 emissions is therefore not actually going down and countries like 
Germany are increasingly importing coal. 
For these reasons and also the aforementioned political reasons, there is 
a genuine interest for shale gas and its technology. This resource could 
diversify Europe’s energy supply. For countries that are relying heavily 
on natural gas from Russia, such as Poland, Romania, Lithuania, shale gas 
would also reduce their dependency on Russian gas supplies.
Having said that, there is a rising general public and government 
concern around the environmental risks, climate change and health 
risks associated with the extraction of unconventional gas. Recent 
developments show that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between 
facts and fiction. For instance, we can hear that emissions from shale 
gas-based power generation are 40% lower than those from coal. 
This estimate is not universally supported as some experts say that 
the environmental footprint is much larger when compared against 
conventional gas activities. The risk associated with water contamination 
also needs to be addressed.
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Estimates of volumes of Danish shale gas present in the country indicates 
that reserves could be ranging between two to three times the Danish 
production of natural gas for the period running from 1972 to 2011. Yet, 
one must look at these estimates with a lot of caution as, and at the time 
of the conference, there had been no drilling for shale gas in Denmark 
so far. Moreover, there had neither been any official estimate of existing 
reserves nor any confirmation that such a study would be carried out in 
the near future. Other public groups are raising their voices concerning 
the impact of shale gas on the development of renewable energy sources. 
Supporting shale gas could divert financial resources which would 
otherwise have gone towards development of renewable energy. 
These are some of the issues which need to be flagged up when assessing 
the future prospects of exploration and production of shale gas resources.
It is also relevant to explore a number of national positions on shale 
gas and to look at recent developments in selected jurisdictions in the 
European Union.
Some countries have already passed laws banning fracking in their 
territory. France and Bulgaria have passed legislation against fracking, 
whereas the UK and Denmark take a less radical stance. Denmark has not 
banned fracking yet but, and just like in Britain, the country has to cope 
with issues of public concern and protests against shale gas activities.
The French ban on fracking has been investigated in a ruling of the French 
constitutional court (Conseil constitutionnel) issued in October 2013. 
This decision gave rise to some interesting developments. Prior to this 
decision, the French parliament had voted a law in July 2011 prohibiting 
using hydraulic fracturing technology for gas on the French territory. 
Moreover, France cancelled two exploration licences held by an American 
company, Schuepbach, as well as the licenses held by Total. This decision 
was taken after several heavy protests ran by environmental groups. In 
court, the licensee held that there was no study available confirming that 
there is any particular risk when conducting fracking. The licensee also 
stated that the ban was unfair because the law was focusing on fracking 
for shale gas and ignored fracking for geothermal activities which had 
been taking place for a longer period. The court responded that the 
lawmakers were following “legitimate goals in the general interest of the 
protection of the environment”. The judges also stated that there was 
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a difference between fracking for geothermal purposes and fracking 
for shale gas resources. In addition, the court rejected the argument 
whereby the granting of licensing interests followed by the revocation of 
the same, was an act of expropriation. The Constitutional Court specified 
that the revocation did not go against French law on property rights. As 
a result, the licensee should not receive any compensation following the 
revocation of the licences. The court finally stated that the law was in 
compliance with the French constitution and that its terms were not being 
violated. As of the date of the conference, there were no similar decisions 
issued by courts located in Denmark or in the United Kingdom.
Another significant issue is the impact of fracking on water resources. No 
public debate fails to stress the importance of protecting groundwater 
and drinking water against risks of contamination. The public became 
very concerned after seeing pictures in an American documentary 
“Gasland”, even though some people say now that the ignited water 
tap shown in the documentary might have little to do with the nearby 
exploration and production of shale gas.
2. Shale gas exploration and production in Denmark
So far, Denmark has granted two licenses. These permits were granted 
in 2010. The government has however been facing a big policy dilemma. 
On the one hand, policymakers want Denmark to enter into a phase 
of energy transition by moving away from fossil fuels and introducing 
renewable energy sources which should cover energy supply needs. By 
2050, Denmark should receive 100% of its energy supply from renewable 
energy sources. On the other hand, the Danish Energy Minister has 
indicated that “if shale gas can be developed in a commercial way and 
in an uncomplicated manner, with no harm to the environment”, then 
the minister would be in favour of its production if such a gas can assist 
in achieving the country’s programmed green energy status. As can be 
understood, Denmark is not saying “no” to shale gas. It is not, however, 
saying “yes” to it unconditionally. Yet, the current government’s stance 
remains closer to a “yes” to shale gas rather than to a more radical “no” 
to this hydrocarbon. This position is premised both on the requirement 
to develop shale gas in an environmentally-friendly way and with 
due consideration for the potential economic impact of shale gas. As 
politicians are saying - it would be unsound for Denmark to say “no” to 
shale gas if it can be developed in an environmentally-safe manner.
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There is a growing interest for shale gas in Denmark by developers. 
Following the two licences issued in 2010, the ministry has received more 
applications for licences. The state secretary has resolved to put those 
applications on hold until the results of the first exploratory will become 
known. This first well will not undergo any hydraulic fracturing. The 
drilling will seek to establish whether there is any shale gas resource in 
the subsoil. Drilling operations for this well were scheduled to start in the 
autumn 2013. This phase of the project has, however, been postponed 
for another year.
3. Are new regulations for shale gas required?
Denmark has introduced a number of changes to its regulatory 
framework. The amendments essentially aimed at identifying whether an 
environmental impact assessment should be introduced at certain phases 
or not.
It should be noted that fracking operations have already taken place in 
Denmark. This technology exists for offshore oil and gas development. 
It has also been tested onshore for geothermal purposes. Regardless of 
whether this technology should be supported or not, there is therefore a 
history of fracking on the Danish territory.
The geology of the Danish territory has been significantly well mapped 
due to earlier onshore drillings. There is a significant amount of 
geological data available for the 3,000- square mile region of Jutland. On 
Sjaelland, where Copenhagen is situated, the geological mapping data is 
significantly less. The northern part of Jutland has therefore been selected 
for shale gas exploratory drilling. The results of exploration tests would 
then help predict whether commercial shale gas can also be found in 
north Sjaelland.
Under the Danish Subsoil Act, prior to any licensing for hydrocarbon, 
the Parliamentary committee on energy must be informed. In relation to 
the two exploration licences for onshore shale gas granted in 2010, the 
fact that the two licences were granted for shale gas exploration did not 
turn them into “special cases”; they were just referred to as being “for 
hydrocarbon”. Under Danish law, and at the time of the conference, 
there was no distinction between onshore licences for conventional or 
unconventional drilling. It is however likely that the framework will be 
amended accordingly in the future. In 2010, the progress on shale gas 
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had been rather uneventful. There was no particular concern or scrutiny 
over shale gas exploration in Denmark. Gradually, however, the political 
parties (and mainly in the opposition) have started to question the State 
Secretary for Energy and Climate. They wished to understand the actual 
impact of shale gas activities and the environmental risks. They also 
wished to clarify the division of responsibility between the local Danish 
municipalities and the government. Indeed in Denmark, the government 
takes responsibility for offshore exploration and production licensing and 
drilling operations. Onshore, the municipalities have control and bear the 
responsibility for handling the environmental permits sucah as required. 
In Denmark there are 98 municipalities. In average, these communities 
cover slightly less than 500 km² and their populations range between 
20,000 to 100,000 inhabitants.
The French company Total holds two exploration licences granted under 
the Danish Subsoil Act. However, the current licensee for shale gas 
holds only 80% of the licensing rights as Danish law requires that the 
government retains a 20% stake in any hydrocarbon licences. This 20% 
stake is held through the Danish North Sea Fund, or “Nordsøfonden”. 
Legally, the two licenses granted so far are “combined exploration and 
production licences”. The licensee enjoys an initial six-year period to 
conduct exploration activities. In the event of a commercial finding of 
hydrocarbon, the license can be extended and the licensee will enjoy 
a further thirty-year period for production. Also, each of these terms 
can be individually extended. Offshore licences are subject to an “open 
invitation” procedure. Licenses are granted as a result of a bidding 
procedure targeting all interested applicants. The licence application must 
come with a work programme. As part of the approval process, the work 
programme might need to be amended. It should subsequently come 
with an evaluation program that will also be subject to approval. 
In relation to the current exploration licence for shale gas in Denmark, 
the first two years of the work programme consist of testing and analysis 
of the geological and physical data which is already available. The 
drilling will take place in the second phase, where the licence holder 
is authorised to carry out drilling in just one well. Due to the inherent 
safety requirements around this drilling, the cost of this test well has been 
assessed to 3.5 million Danish crowns. This amount is much higher than 
the one associated with standard drilling operations.
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In case of any discovery, the next step is to authorise further drillings and 
proceed with hydrofracking. In theory, the exploration period should 
come to term in 2016. Production will be subject to the granting of an 
extension. This additional authorisation will be limited to part of the 
licence where gas reserves have been identified. Other licenced areas will 
have to be surrendered.
Obtaining a licence is subject to a number of approvals from the ministry. 
Each and every drilling must receive a pre-approval on the technology 
and drilling process the operator will use. If exploration leads to a possible 
production then the licence holder must submit a special development 
plan to the Danish Energy Agency. The model licence for onshore oil and 
gas activities makes no exception as to the licensee’s obligation to collect 
all approvals and authorisations needed from the Danish environmental 
agencies. Securing an onshore licence does not guarantee that the 
necessary environmental permits will therefore be granted. For instance 
the licensee will need to secure permits for the extraction of water as part 
of the exploration phase. For the fracking phase they will need to obtain 
additional water permits as well as permits for water discharges.9 
Shale gas operators, like any other oil and gas operators in Denmark, 
bear a strict liability regime in relation to any damage caused by them or 
by their activities. Licensees must also provide a bank or parent company 
guarantee, together with an insurance policy.
In relation to offshore operations, a special safety regime exists in 
Denmark. Onshore, the general safety rules enforceable for any activity 
will apply- i.e. the Planning Act, the Environmental Protection Act, the 
Water Supply Act and the Working Environment Act.
Altogether, this regulation makes onshore operations a complex 
environment. It appears to be actually more complex than offshore 
operations. As indicated earlier, municipalities will handle the planning 
side of the project. This implies that the planning process will have a very 
significant involvement of public and stakeholder participation. 
9The public debate around fracking in Denmark tends to favour that seawater be 
used for fracking as opposed to injecting of the ground water coming from drinking 
water resources. In order to monitor and avoid pollution, water quality tests must 
also be conducted before, during and after drilling operations.
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The process governing the environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
requires that all neighbours, authorities and all other relevant parties 
should be heard as part of the planning process. In July 2012, this regime 
was amended in order to cover shale gas activities. In its annexes, the 
Danish EIA regulation distinguishes between two types of projects. 
Fracking must always be subject to an EIA according to Annex 1 of the 
regulation. Deep drilling without fracking is subject to Annex 2 guidelines 
and a decision as to submitting this operation to an EIA will be subject 
to the results of this initial screening. The duty to initiate the screening 
process with municipalities lies with the licensee.
4. Enhanced public participation during the planning process for 
the very first Danish shale gas projects
As just indicated, an EIA requires that any interested public be invited to 
take part to the process. Several rounds of auditions must take place with 
members of the public and government authorities. As part of the very 
first shale gas projects carried out by Total in Denmark, the municipalities 
have used the powers that allow them to request additional public 
meetings and conferences with interested governmental authorities. 
These meetings are aimed at obtaining more information on the proposed 
shale gas exploration and their associated risks. 
In order to guarantee full transparency, the municipalities associated 
with Total’s project publically disclosed all the material received from 
the project’s applicant. The municipalities also wrote to the Danish 
Minister requesting him to reconsider whether shale gas projects 
should take place or not. The reason behind this letter probably lied in 
the fact that the municipalities did not feel particularly apt to decide as 
to whether they should authorise this project. However, the ministry 
chose not to interfere. In January 2013, an additional public meeting 
took place together with the three main Danish authorities: the Danish 
Nature Agency, the Environment Agency and the Energy Agency. 
Interestingly, none of these agencies had any specific comments in 
relation to preventing the drilling of an exploratory well for shale gas. 
This position provided a higher degree of comfort to the municipalities 
for them to authorise drilling for exploration. The municipalities’ technical 
committees advised their councils to authorise the proposed exploration 
- also acknowledging that the result of the screening were satisfactory 
and that no specific environmental impact assessment was required. The 
councils heard their technical committees but still chose to request a full 
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environmental impact assessment. As a consequence, the exploration 
project was postponed by 12 months. Legally, Total was entitled to appeal 
against this decision but chose not to do so. As of the end of 2013, Total 
was already conducting its environmental impact assessment. The results 
obtained from this EIA will also be useful to Total in support of its future 
project’s applications and paperwork.
5. Conclusion
Denmark can boast of having one of the strictest environmental 
frameworks. If this country authorises exploration and production 
activities for onshore shale gas, it will send a very important message 
to other interested observers. The Danish decision-making process 
is gradual and there is no hurry or overnight rush to take resolutions 
on shale gas exploration. This is the result of a cautious, step-by-step, 
decision-making process. At the time of the conference, the position of 
the Danish Ministry was to issue no additional exploration licenses until 
the results of the first authorised well bring satisfactory certainty on the 
existence of underground shale gas resources. Also, the prospect of 
seeing a shale gas industry emerge in Denmark will be subject to public 






The transcript published below reflects the presentation delivered by Dr 
Toke at RGU in Aberdeen in November 2013. Had David Toke delivered 
this contribution at the time of printing in 2015 his comments would have 
been different based on how policies have changed. Since 2013, the UK 
government has introduced various policies such as the government’s 
community energy programme or the ‘auction’ system of allocating 
contracts. The government has also proposed to review incentives for 
onshore wind and solar.
As an academic who spent part of his early career with the 
Renewables industry, Dr Toke occupies a privileged position. His 
experience and background allow him to look at the bigger picture of 
investment and policy aspects for the structuring of energy projects. 
Getting a sense of the “bigger picture” also helps him anticipate what 
should be coming ahead and see through future developments. At 
the conference, David Toke first proposed to discuss the profile of 
policies emerging to support renewables in the next few years. In 
doing so, Dr Toke chose to explore some of the options open for 
Scotland. He also touched on the meaning of community renewables 
and community benefits. David Toke’s conclusions are based on his 
personal research around policies for the deployment of renewable 
energy sources (RES) across the United Kingdom, and beyond. His 
research approach includes analysing large volumes of statistics, 
official data and figures. This approach also implies looking at the 
planning and financial side of renewable energy projects. Dr Toke’s 
holistic approach has proven to be particularly relevant in relation to 
his observation of technologies such as wind power. 
Financing RES projects
Starting off with the financial environment, it transpires that the up and 
coming financial environment has dictated the progress of the electricity 
market reform. Locally, the financial environment has had implications 
on debates about Scotland’s energy future, and how this country can 
best negotiate conditions in encouraging community ownership and 
community benefits. In relation to the two latter items, their close analysis 
invites to better understand how these instruments could be overlapping 
and to what extent. They require exploring some of the options which 
have proven to be good ideas in practice. They also invite to appreciate 
how these issues have been approached elsewhere - as well as what 
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could be the best possible scenarios for Scotland, and how this country 
could move forward with them.
In order to appreciate the current financial support to RES, it seems 
important to seek to assess the meaning of the Renewables Obligation.10 
This scheme allows the selling of renewable obligations certificates 
in the market. This approach can create quite a good environment 
for developing community renewables as it means that investors can 
generate a good return if the bulk of their investment is an equity 
one. This conclusion appears to verify when there is just a need for 
the investors to borrow little or no money from the bank and that the 
target is to get as big a shareholder return as possible. If the investors 
are ethical investors willing to fund community renewables project, and 
there is a capacity to minimise the amount of money borrowed from the 
banks, then the Renewables Obligation can be quite a useful instrument 
for developing community-owned schemes. At the moment, there are 
not that many community owned schemes in the United Kingdom. 
There are a few very well-known schemes, such as the Westmill Wind 
Farm in Oxfordshire. The equity portion in this community scheme is 
approximately 40 to 45% and investors managed to borrow 50 or 55% 
from the Cooperative Bank. The Renewables Obligation provided a 
good incentive to structure this financing. The Westmill scheme was 
able to secure a contract from one of the electricity suppliers which 
enabled them to cover the bank loan - and the return to shareholders was 
covered by selling their renewables obligation certificates (ROC) on the 
ROC open market. Financing structure around ROCs proves therefore 
to work reasonably well. The view that it is the Renewables Obligation 
that prevents community owned renewables from getting ahead in this 
country is therefore not sustainable. The basic problem is that there 
are not enough people trying to take advantage of this scheme. There 
are probably a number of sociological explanations for this resistance, 
but discussing them here would prove to be beyond the scope of this 
conference.
 
This first conclusion invites to understand the impact of the electricity 
market reform on community renewables. 
10This scheme appears to be open for financing community renewables projects.
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Electricity market reform
Unfortunately, it would appear that the electricity market reform is 
going to be bad for community renewables. As it stands, this reform 
is not going to make community schemes impossible but its approach 
is not going to make such projects as good as they could potential be. 
Unless government in Westminster or Edinburgh introduces some new 
measures, this electricity market reform will reduce the potential and ease 
with which community renewables have been made possible so far with 
the help of the Renewables Obligation. To understand why it is going to 
get worse, we need to start with the feed-in tariff which is available in this 
country. The UK has a feed-in tariff, just as Germany has, but the UK’s 
feed in tariff is not structured similarly to the one in Germany. In fact, the 
UK’s system is in various aspects the opposite of the one in Germany 
where the utilities, big, major electricity companies will have a monopoly 
over the power purchase agreements. The contracts are different. 
The whole point of the German feed-in tariff was to give independent 
generators and community schemes the ability to get power purchase 
agreements without having to go cap in hand to the utilities companies. 
Under the British system, the independent generators, be they large or 
small, are going to have to go cap in hand to the oligopolies. In practice, 
this means that even big independent generators and people like Fred 
Olsen11 may not be getting £95 per megawatt-hour from 2018 based on 
fifteen-year contracts, as is advertised by the Treasury, but instead maybe 
£80 per megawatt-hour.
The government has said it will introduce some measures to make sure 
other people get contracts. The meaning of this statement remains 
currently very vague. It assumed that it could mean the big electricity 
companies are going to get a considerable amount of unearned income 
from these power purchase agreements under various excuses - like that 
they have to pay for balancing costs and other similar costs. Calculations 
performed to asses such costs have revealed that they represent no more 
than £2 or £3 per megawatt-hour. Therefore, when the government says 
wind power is getting £95 per megawatt-hour from 2018, this is incorrect. 
The utilities are getting that amount and based on the foregoing, what 
goes to renewables schemes is a different matter.
11Fred Olsen is an onshore wind farm projects developer in Scotland.
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Such an inconsistency certainly testifies of a degree of policy propaganda 
surrounding Britain’s electricity system which also is increasingly moving 
towards justifying nuclear deal such as Hinkley C, Sizewell C and a 
few more to come. This inconsistency also creates a big discount for 
independent contractors, which includes the community renewables, 
who are much less able to negotiate with the big companies and people 
like Fred Olsen who are big independent generators.
Until quite recently it would have appeared quite unreasonable to support 
the idea of an independent Scottish electricity system. Under these 
circumstances, it now appears to be quite a good idea because of the 
decisions taken under the current electricity market reform. 
Following the EMR and the nuclear deal, the picture has somewhat 
changed. Previously it was argued that because the costs for funding 
renewable energy were socialised throughout the whole of the UK, 
it would therefore be very difficult for Scotland to fund renewable 
electricity. Certainly, the offshore renewables part of it would require 
considerable increases in electricity prices which are politically 
unacceptable.
The announcement for funding new nuclear power contained in the EMR 
statement has changed things dramatically. Now all British electricity 
consumers are going to pay for significant extra charges in their electricity 
bills from 2013 onwards. Bills are likely to rise from 3% to 9% depending 
on whether the UK invests in two, four or six reactors. Hinkley will see 
another set of reactors that the government says it is quite confident of 
getting.
 
In the scenario of an independent Scottish electricity system either 
under (i) independence or (ii) a revised form of devolution, consumers 
in Scotland will be able to avoid the extra cost associated with these 
new investments in nuclear infrastructures. If the same amount of 
money was spent on renewable energy sources with a revised and more 
efficient plan than the one that is currently considered, the transition 
towards renewables could be achieved at a cheaper price. Also, the UK 
government says that it is giving equivalent “incentives” or “subsidies”, 
however one wants to call them, to nuclear or renewables. The UK 
government is giving a considerably better deal to nuclear than to 
technologies like onshore wind and related technologies. An independent 
Scottish system could do cheaper wind power than the headline figure 
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of “£95-per-megawatt-hour-for fifteen-year-contracts” currently available 
under the EMR. There are three reasons that can be put forward for this 
claim. Firstly, the possibility to introduce longer term contracts. Indeed, 
we can see that the term of contracts for premium renewables obligation 
prices has been reduced from 20 to 15 years. The rationale behind 
this decision is unclear. This reduction coincides with the increase in 
headline price just above the £92.5 per megawatt-hour for Hinkley C. If 
the government maintained twenty year contract for onshore wind, the 
headline figure for investment would then be lower than £95. In terms of 
EU law, investment in nuclear power plant like Hinckley also require state-
aid approval with the commission through a special application, in which 
investments in renewables are not required. Thirdly, a major support for 
nuclear investment is actually loan guarantees. Without such guarantees 
nuclear power plants are unfundable. The government provides a loan 
guarantee of 65% of the capital cost of Hinkley C. If the government 
gave loan guarantees to renewables, this policy would benefit to such 
projects. These investments do not require a high amount of guarantee 
as they can provide a high degree of certainty about their costs and other 
variables. Wind energy projects do not have such a lead time where they 
have to shell out money without getting any return. Also, investments 
in renewable forms of energy sources do not vitally require guarantees 
similar to those backing nuclear investments. But if State guarantees are 
offered, they would certainly reduce the cost of private investment. This 
approach exists in other countries, such as Germany where investors can 
obtain support equivalent to loan guarantees through various means. 
This support reduces the costs of wind power quite considerably and 
when these two criteria are factored into a spreadsheet, the price for wind 
power comes down considerably from £95 per megawatt-hour. With a 
65% loan guarantee and a twenty year contract, it is possible to fund a 
good wind power system for £80 per megawatt-hour. With a proper feed-
in tariff system like in Germany (and not just playing in favour of utilities 
that seek to skim off a lot of cash to compensate for their lost income 
from power plants) any independent producers can generate power at 
a cheaper price, and given a slightly equivalent windiness, community 
renewables will do it a lot more cheaply as well. Therefore, a self-standing 
Scottish program organised in the right way can deliver renewables much 
more cheaply and at am affordable price, when taking into account it 
would not have to pay for nuclear power.
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However, this programme would not be funding offshore wind and 
tidal energy systems. Tidal energy generation is not going to happen 
without loan guarantees as they are very new technology, innovative and 
unexplored for the banks to fund them. In the current state of affairs, 
nuclear is getting loan guarantees whereas tidal stream and wave power 
are not getting it. This is certainly incorrect and should be rectified.
On offshore wind, Fergus Ewing12 was correct to send a strong letter to 
the government about the Electricity Market Reform’s (EMR) impact. 
He was right to point out that offshore renewables are just not going to 
happen under the EMR. This conclusion makes the exercise of comparing 
the cost of an independent Scottish energy system versus the one of 
the British energy system under the EMR highly theoretical. Indeed, 
there is no point in trying to factor the costs of an independent Scottish 
electricity system if the EMR is not going to fund offshore renewables. 
This conclusion makes comparing the costs of the two systems 
impossible. Having said that, if the question is asked “could you run an 
independent Scottish electricity system with a renewables program to 
meet the 100% renewables target by the early 2020s at the same cost, 
or less, to consumer than that is funded by the British system as a whole 
(or remaining British system)?”, then the answer must be positive. 
Onshore wind plus a few other cheaper renewables would make this 
target achievable. Planning may be an obstacle to meet this target, but it 
does not appear implausible to get fairly close to the “100%” renewable 
target. This ambitious, yet achievable, target should now receive more 
attention as renewables can give rise to a lot of new projects. These 
projects would include more community renewables project which are 
not being done, cannot be done now or are languishing under the whip of 
a nuclear-warranted electricity market reform that is being put in place by 
Westminster. 
Social license
Turning to social license and community benefits, the British 
government’s policy is moving towards community benefits at £5,000 
per megawatt. Local communities will have a big influence on how the 
community benefits’ will be dispersed. My recent studies around wind 
farm and planning issues through both quantitative and qualitative 
12At the time of the conference, Mr Fergus Ewing MSP was the Scottish Minister 
for Energy, Enterprise & Tourism.
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analysis have confirmed that the people who are most likely to object 
to wind farms, and campaign against them, are the people who live 
the closest to the proposed developments. Consequently, offering 
community benefits through grants and other similar benefit to local 
schools may be interesting but care must be taken to ensure that 
the community benefits money should go to the people who are the 
closest to the wind farm projects and the money they generate. This is a 
straightforward idea and no renewable energy company seems too keen 
to be actively taking this up. 
Some people are also suggesting that wind farm developers should 
pay for a part of the local community’s electricity bills. The closer to the 
wind farm, the larger the share of their individual electricity bills amount 
should be paid to the local residents. This suggestion certainly sounds 
like a simple idea, but if community benefits are to be introduced, the 
payment of electricity bills of local communities is one the most direct and 
most effective ways of achieving these. That is not to say that providing 
schemes to help local schools, or build local by-passes are not very 
good ideas. But when looking at minimising planning opposition and 
considering the electricity bill funding option, it is certainly a benefit that 
ought to be tried a lot more than it has been done so far. Other ideas for 
community benefits could be put forward, but these are the options that 
would seem desirable to see being very strongly promoted. It would also 
be interesting to see more experimentation of other forms of community 
benefits in order to better understand how well these other options could 
work and what could be best way of organising them. 
Community-owned schemes
Community benefits and community ownership are two distinct concepts. 
However, it is possible to combine the two approaches. There is an 
interesting community-owned energy project in Denmark, in Hvide 
Sande which is a fishing port. The harbour’s tourist board, named the 
“Holmsland Klit Tourist Association Foundation”, has set up a wind farm 
project which is owned by the local fishing community. The 9-megawatt 
wind farm delivers community benefits. The revenue helps towards the 
port’s redevelopment. Hvide Sande has established a trust fund providing 
equity and called onto the local banks’ assistance to give it good terms. 
This project was received with very few objections as compared to 
other proposed developments in the area which was hit by many local 
objections. Community-owned schemes are no panacea for getting rid 
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of planning objections. There is also growing evidence that community 
owned wind farms tend to reduce the opposition.
So, could combined community benefits and community ownership 
schemes happen more in Scotland? The answer appears to be positive. 
The biggest barrier is the dearth of facility for lending money at low 
interest rates to provide a large portion of the capital investment needed. 
Most local banks in Scotland will not take collateral from local assets, 
farmers or otherwise, and give reasonably good interest rates on bank 
loans. Going back to the discussion over State guarantees available for 
nuclear projects, there should be a similar sort of government-backed 
loan facility for community renewables and renewables projects in general 
for Scotland. 
Also making reference to the comments made above in relation to the 
impact of an independent Scotland, or a revised version of devolution, 
on the cost of the Scottish energy system, it would appear that 
Scotland could fund more and cheaper renewable projects after such 
a constitutional change. This country’s policy priorities could lead to 
Scotland offering more possibilities for community renewables. With a 
distinct energy system, Scottish citizens could fund renewables programs 
much more cheaply than what is being done now. The required internal 
rate of return could go down by about 2%. 
The recipe for success around renewable energy sources’ developments 
requires a bit of theory and making a number of rational choices. Looking 
at efforts to get community renewables going in Scotland, research 
shows that it is required that more people must try to do it with a financial 
commitment while believing in that it will be a success in the longer term. 
This is a rational choice theory, and a political science theory. If there is 
a financial commitment in a project then there is more chance that the 
investors will make more efforts to get their money back and/or get a 
return. Individual investments can vary, for example each person can 
contribute £1,000. So fifty people will raise £50,000 - which is enough to 
carry out the initial work. Personal involvements also matter a great deal 
for the success of community projects. To somebody with a local job, 
getting involved with the local community project can mean helping bring 
this project into existence. By doing so, this person is also likely to extend 
his or her local employment by making the project success, preferably 
beyond the project’s completion date.
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Dr Karen Parkhill 
Dr Parkhill’s approach to energy issue differs from the ones of other 
speakers at the conference as Dr Parkhill focuses on the scientific 
understanding of citizens and public’s attitude towards energy 
project. Her presentation was based on a scientific report launched 
over the summer 2013 as part of a project called “Transforming 
the UK’s Energy System”. It is the result of two-and-a-half years of 
interdisciplinary project which started when Dr Parkhill was active 
at Cardiff University and includes investigators at Cardiff University 
and the University of Nottingham.13 Dr Parkhill’s presentation to 
the conference included a summary of her research project and a 
discussion on community energy.
Background
When considering energy systems’ changes, understanding the “public 
perspective” is very important for a number of reasons.14 The public 
is deeply concerned at how energy systems are configured as they 
are: energy producers (the number of which is increasing); energy 
consumers with a voting power (and who can have influence on types of 
government); active proponents and protesters (who tend to focus on the 
local sides of things). All are deeply implicated in our energy systems in 
different ways.
Looking towards 2050, there is a need in the UK to explore and define 
a vision for the energy system. There are different scenarios available 
designed for various types of people and organisations like notably the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), the WWF or the UK 
Energy Research Centre.15 One common weakness that these scenarios 
13This project involved Dr Parkhill, as a geographer, but also psychology, 
architecture and engineering academics within the School of Psychology at Cardiff 
University. Dr Parkhill also wished to extend her gratitude to Christina Demski and 
Catherine Butler.
14 When looking at “energy systems”, Dr Parkhill does not approach this concept 
from a simple supply and demand perspective. She also looks at the regulatory 
framework; the public (includes consumers and producers) and; the energy system 
(through its broad diversity and as it is being considered in anticipation of the 
climate change targets set for 2050).
15The UK Energy Research Centre funded the research supporting Dr Parkhill’s 
presentation to the conference.
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have is that they tend to make very simplified assumptions about public 
perspective. These are very basic assumptions due to a lack of empirical 
evidence. There is a real gap of understanding as to what the public 
thinks about changes in energy systems. There has been a lot of public 
work done on single issues such as the public perception of wind energy, 
nuclear power or selected aspects of the demand side of energy. Very 
little work has, however, been produced focusing on interrelated sets of 
transitions in energy systems.
The project was organised around three interconnected work packages. 
The work package number one looked at what experts thought of the 
different scenarios that the research team presented and what they 
thought should be used for 2050 through carefully targeted expert 
interviews. The research team also looked at scenarios that were already 
developed and they looked with their engineering colleagues as to 
how to target the information that the team would need for the various 
phases of this work. The second phase was the qualitative work in which 
workshops were organised in six different places across UK: Cardiff, 
Edinburgh, London, plus areas with locally-relevant energy issues such as 
Cumbria (due to Sellafield), Merthyr Tydfil in Wales (due to its coal mining 
history) and settlements close to the Whitelee wind farm (at the time, the 
largest onshore wind energy development in Europe). Quite importantly, 
the team did not have the public just discuss current scenarios. Instead 
it invited them to use the “DECC My 2050” online tool to create their 
own scenario and define what kind of transition they would have to live 
through.16 The quantitative phase of the project involved a nationally 
representative survey which looked at attitudes towards energy system 
change. The survey contained multiple parts and also included the “My 
2050” tool. The public were invited to design its own energy transition 
scenario by manipulating the options available on the online tool. Instead 
of always checking whether each scenario created by respondents would 
lead to a 20% carbon reduction (a target of the tool), the research team 
was more interested in giving the public an opportunity to think about 
the whole energy system. The findings of the qualitative and quantitative 
phases were transcribed in two extensive written reports.
16The deck "My 2050" scenario can be seen on slide No. 6 of Dr Parkhill's 
PowerPoint presentation.
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The purpose of the presentation at the conference was to look more 
specifically at the values reflected in these reports. The reason for 
looking at values is that they underlie people’s preferences. Building an 
understanding of public values potentially provides a more durable sense 
of public attitudes towards changes to the UK’s energy system.
 
Public Vision
The research found that the public vision for the energy system of the 
future is one that contributes to meet the broader target of a sustainable 
future. On the supply side, this involves a strong commitment to 
renewable forms of energy production and a corresponding shift away 
from fossil fuels. On the demand side, it relates to the development 
of technology and infrastructures, such as public transports, demand 
management techniques, electric vehicles’ charging points that will help 
support the likely changing lifestyle and achieve a reduction in energy 
demand. On the surface, this vision looks like it has to do with different 
technologies. The research team, however, did not conclude that it was 
the case. It found that this vision actually has to do with public values.
The research found that there is a strong preference for renewable 
energy. This form of energy is regarded as renewable, clean, fair and just.
Nevertheless if, say, a solar farm established in North Africa would be 
found to be contaminating its local environment and if it was found to 
be causing a lot of local contestation by local people the research team 
believes that the British public would no longer support renewable solar 
energy. The public would see it as contravening the values that they 
associate with this technology. The public might still see it as renewable 
but no longer as fair and just. 
So, and to the research team, the public support is not about the 
technology. The findings showed that it is actually about the values that 
people associate with the energy system. But, what public wants is an 
energy system that does not contravene those values. More ideally they 
want one that represents those values. So it matters to understand what 
values can mean and what they are, and also look at pragmatic aspects.
Values
The literature on “values” covers a vast array of different disciplines. It 
makes it quite difficult to understand what people mean by “values”. At 
the basic level, the research team suggests that “values” are the guiding 
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principles that people draw upon. However, the team does not suggest 
that any one person will hold all these values. There is a social value 
system. The team suggests that values are cultural resources that people 
can draw upon when they are developing their preferences. In other 
words, the public is not expected to hold all the values which have been 
identified in the research. Rather, members of the public are expected 
to draw upon those values when making their decisions about their 
preferences for the content of the future energy system.
Identified Values
The study has helped identify the following values:
• reducing the use of finite resources
• reducing the overall level of energy use
• avoiding waste and being efficient
• capturing opportunities
• environmental protection
• availability, naturalness and nature
• availability and affordability, reliability, safety
• social justice, fairness, honesty and transparency
• long-term trajectories, interconnected, improvement in quality
• autonomy and freedom of choice and control.
This list of values will now be selectively discussed.
Beginning with the public value “efficient and not wasteful” it can be 
inferred that one important component of the energy system should be 
to avoid waste. Waste is regarded as inherently bad and at the moment 
there is a perception that the energy system is quite wasteful. People 
perceive that an awful lot of our energy is being lost and this is a source 
of concern in the context of finite resources. The energy system should 
avoid producing waste products. Here, “waste” could be nuclear or 
carbon wastes as these forms of wastes can lead to pollution. Hence a 
proper waste management must be in place. The structure of the energy 
system cannot ignore these forms of wastes and they must be managed 
in the future. Apart from managing waste effectively, the energy system 
should be more efficient in terms of technical capacity and energy 
services. 
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The energy system for 2050 and beyond should also seek to capture 
different opportunities. The public hear about the green economy, the 
jobs and other potential benefits attached to it. The energy system should 
reflect these benefits.
 
The energy system should also use and produce energy in an 
environmentally conscious way. It should not harm the environment 
but, in turn, protect wildlife, nature and ecosystems. It must also avoid 
pollution and contamination.
We also need to think about the relationship between nature and society. 
At the moment there is a perception that we regard nature as a resource 
that is bound to be depleted. However, we should be looking at creating 
a more synergistic relationship with nature. Hence the modern energy 
system should also be more secure and stable, which means that the 
system should ensure access to energy services, along with its availability 
and affordability. The system should be reliable and safe in production for 
delivery of energy services. 
Turning now to “energy security” the role of the energy system must be 
assessed at the national level to identify whether it is reliable or prone 
to shocks. Unsurprisingly, the public does not want a system which 
would be prone to shocks. Moreover, the public does not necessarily 
think that importing energy is a bad thing, as long as these imports are 
handled in a sympathetic manner and in line with the other values that 
are represented. A “safe energy system” does not just mean having safe 
nuclear power stations and their safety for the people living close to them. 
The public wants an energy system that is safe for the people who work 
for the energy system both domestically and internationally. Hence, the 
public recognises that the energy system is part of a global system. 
The values of “autonomy” and “power” reflect the need for the energy 
system to be mindful of the importance of autonomy and freedom both at 
national and personal level. In terms of personal “freedom of choice” and 
“control”, this set of values is not about having a number of developments 
imposed upon the public by the supply-side. It is also referring to energy 
demand management, practices and interventions. While the study 
reported some support for automated energy demand management, it 
transpired that people do not like the idea of outside agents interfering 
with their activities. Automation with a certain degree of manual control is 
therefore preferred over total automation.
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Also, the energy system of 2050 should be sophisticated enough for 
people to live healthy lives. The system must be “fair” and “inclusive” 
where actors are “honest” and “transparent”. Such a system echoes with 
the literature on social justice where there should be a fairer distribution 
of costs and benefits. “Costs” and “benefits” here are not terms merely 
referring to finance and economy. These terms include criteria such as 
social, environmental and financial impacts of the different developments 
leading to the energy system for 2050. These values also connect with 
the intra and inter-generational justice. They are not just about the UK or 
the current generations. It is not just about thinking about how biomass 
or energy crops might be produced. These values are also about the 
consequences of these choices for future generations.
 
Behind the values of “honesty” and “transparency”, there is a suggestion 
that these features are not currently being represented in our energy 
system. There is a perception that certain stakeholders or actors can 
manipulate our energy system for their own benefit. 
The points made in this keynote show that publics are not just concerned 
about the “end vision” they are also interested in the process by which 
the energy system changes. So, processes and changes in the energy 
system with a long-term trajectory should be interconnected. It should 
show changes and improvements in associated technical advances and 
quality of life. This might mean that the UK needs to think not just about 
2050 but beyond 2050. The public involved in the workshops questioned 
why the study was focusing on 2050, as the actual questions go far 
beyond this date. The public also questioned how it is possible to achieve 
these long-term trajectories given that the government works often in 5 
year cycles. In that respect, the presentation by Professor Rønne and her 
description of the Danish cross-party agreement, showed how efficient 
it is to make sure that the political will or political ideas about the UK’s 
energy system go beyond the current government in power. The public 
also recognises the fact that the energy system is interconnected and that 
multiple actors are involved. Energy is also relevant to transport policy, 
health policy and a plethora of policy areas. People would like to see the 
government acknowledging this reality and the diversity of actors around 
energy issues. At the moment, the public think that it is not so much the 
case and that energy issues are being dealt in silos.
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Looking back on the above-identified public values, the picture looks 
altogether quite ideal. It could be argued that this perception is not very 
realistic. Our participants recognised this and gave due consideration to 
pragmatic views. The research conducted also indicated that having an 
energy system that considers those values is actually quite critical. If the 
UK wants to achieve its energy system transformation or transition by 
disregarding this value system, then there is likely to be greater risks of 
contestation. Hence engaging with those values appears quite critical. 
In terms of pragmatism, the values set out in the research offer a vision on 
how “the world should be”. However, people are not ignorant of the fact 
that the world might be different from what they would hope for. Also, 
the public creates its views on the world through its own experiences 
and within its context. All of these views interact to help shape what 
they think the energy system should look like. This does not suggest that 
government should not strive to go in the direction of that ideal energy 
system incorporating those values. Nevertheless, the public is realistic 
that it might not be entirely possible. 
They also acknowledge that there might be some contradictions in their 
pragmatic way of thinking.
For instance, the public is quite keen to move away from fossil fuels but 
at the same time, the public’s experience of different energy systems 
taught them that fossil fuels could be a quite good thing. Even if fossil 
fuel is dirty and non-renewable, gas in central heating system is seen as 
highly controllable and responsive. So the energy system should be able 
to emulate these different characteristics to make it attractive. Public 
recognises that it is quite difficult to achieve this combination and that the 
socio-geographical context will effect the energy system. For example, 
the latter dimension matters for decision-making purposes. This includes 
not just local issues for wind and nuclear power but also the living context 
which needs to be taken into account when implementing and designing 
demand strategies. Urban settings come first to the mind when thinking 
about energy system change. With that particular type of settings, it is not 
necessarily feasible to request to shift energy demand to night slots for 
populations living in quite densely populated areas. The public therefore 
expects constraints to be taken into account when trying to assess what 
the UK will be able to implement in relation to changes in its energy 
system.
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The term “context” also relates to the wider social and political criteria. 
Not unlike what is stated above in relation to political will, it includes 
the messages which have been communicated to the public in terms 
of rhetoric and body language of government. Often the public feels 
that government is saying one thing but doing another. Such a situation 
develops mistrust and people think that leaders are not living up to their 
expectations. “Context” also relates to national and international events. 
Being responsive to events like Fukushima is important.
So, pragmatism teaches us that in relation to the values discussed above, 
there is a need to consider how the world operates, how the public view 
shapes, and the context in which the UK finds itself. As a result, it is 
entirely possible that some of the least preferred options, because of this 
pragmatic view, would still be relatively acceptable to the public, as long 
as it allows for these long-term visions and that the proposed changes 
cannot be achieved in a different way. For example, research on carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) identified that there was a lack of preference 
for this technology. This is not just to do with the waste aspect of it (which 
we have seen connects with certain clusters of values) but also has to do 
with CCS being a sign of continuation in the consumption of certain finite 
resources. Nevertheless, the public recognises the fact that CCS may 
be the only way to attenuate the issues associated with carbon dioxide 
for some sectors; the public therefore seems to find CCS appropriate for 
industry.
Beyond the above pragmatic aspects, the public also recognises that 
bringing about change and ensuring trajectories towards an energy 
system commensurate with the values which have been identified could 
be quite challenging. This leads to the question asking “which actors 
should be responsible for getting the UK towards this energy vision?”
The public’s views on “responsibilities” are that they should not be 
allocated to just one group of actors. They would rather allocate 
responsibilities to each and every one of the groups discussed earlier. It 
appears reasonable to state that ultimately the government has the most 
responsibility, partly because it can be held accountable. The public 
expects the government to work in the public’s interest, whereas the 
industry is regarded as profit-motivated. Therefore, energy companies 
are expected to take a limited responsibility for the energy transition. This 
conclusion is important when remembering that a lot of energy policies 
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are being rolled out and associated with energy companies. The latter are 
seen as being quite important for financing the transition and pumping 
some of their profits back into the transition’s development, rather than 
just banking their profits. Energy companies are nevertheless impacted by 
trust issues as they are regarded as being opaque in their operations.
Governments are seen as accountable for developing the system but 
they seem to be driven by short-term motives. Governments want to 
drive change but due to the nature of the political system, they are 
experiencing difficulties in delivering energy changes. Trust has been 
eroded between citizens, governments and industry. The positive 
notes lies in that if trust can be rebuilt - and because citizens and public 
recognise the fact that they also have a role to play in the energy system 
transition and having a energy efficient future - the public actually 
believes in that reciprocal relationship where if they see industry and 
government play their parts, they will actually be willing to come on 
board and play their own part. At the moment, the citizens’ case tends 
to indicate that they feel they are being left on their own. They are being 
told to do one thing, when other actors are actually doing another thing, 
hence people are unsure as to what to do.
A number of conclusions can be made here.
1. The British public wants and expects change. The public recognises 
that the country as a whole is going through the transition. It is through 
an enthusiastic partnership that they can witness the change.
2. What they want is an energy system that is responsive to the values 
discussed above. Durable public acceptability may only be achieved if 
it is rooted in the value system as identified by this study.
 
3. The public will not be accepting a form of change that does not show 
a sign of commitment to longer-term trajectories commensurate with 
those values. The public wants proof and evidence of a long-term, 
coherent, trajectory even if the latter has to go beyond 2050. The 
public wants to understand in-depth what the country is aiming for and 
how. The longer term energy system change’s trajectory should be 
aligned with public values and if done so they can form the basis of a 
social contract for change. 
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This research did not look at the ways in which energy system could 
be configured. The study focused on a centralised energy system. This 
made people think about the energy system as a whole. However, this 
created a gap in the study as interviewees were not asked to comment on 
off-grid and super-grid options. The study also did not look in great detail 
on issues of ownership of the energy infrastructure. The study primarily 
looked into nationalised and privately-owned energy systems. There is a 
lot more work that needs to be done about the cost and affordability of 
energy systems’ transitions.
What does this value system mean for community energy?
Given some of our research’s weaknesses as just mentioned above, can 
this value system apply to other pathways that may, at first sight, look 
irrelevant? 
We actually do not think that it is the case. 
When this study was released, one of the criticisms expressed in the press 
was that we did not ask people for their views on fracking. However, if 
it is looked from the perspective of values and the concept of “shifting 
a way from finite resources”, and shale gas being a finite resource, it is 
acceptable to find that the public do not want to have a system that rests 
on limited resources. Fracking could therefore be reasonably found to 
contravene those values.
Our value system also suggests that community energy should be 
supported and it is often seen that community energy is “a good thing”. 
But the values also suggest that there is a need to critically reflect on 
the role of community energy. Developing community energy can be 
done in ways which are not in line with the values associated with it. 
Nevertheless, it can be seen how they connect with finite and reducing 
resources, which are vital to community renewables energy. In theory, 
community energy should be developed in a “socially just” way: reflecting 
honesty, transparency - and it should also connect with autonomy, 
freedom of choice and control.
Another claim made about community energy says that there is actually 
a limited role for it in our future energy system. If one takes a very 
narrow definition of “community energy” then this claim would appear 
true. However, when considering the wide varieties of ways in which 
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community energy can be created - for instance, local infrastructure 
group could manage infrastructure in their local area; local groups could 
be active in fighting against fuel poverty - the value system indicates that 
there could be a bigger role for community energy in our energy system.
In community energy, the notion that “we can do more together than 
individually” is very important. It connects with the values of social justice, 
honesty and transparency, autonomy, freedom of choice and control. Our 
work has evidenced that individual people can be a bit hesitant to choose 
innovative technology. They are worried that they will be stigmatised or 
labelled as “not normal.” Community energy initiatives could help with 
this. So, accepting energy innovations, whatever they may be, could 
certainly be done in variety of ways so long as those innovations are 
based on the values discussed. 
There is therefore a bigger role for community energy than what is 
currently conceived. Community energy should also be approached 
beyond renewables. The values also suggest that there should be a long 
term support for community energy, and there is a need for commitment 
about community energy.
The values are therefore useful for guiding policymakers. They are there 
to help policymakers critically reflect upon what can be done when they 





Mr Greg Gordon 
Mr Greg Gordon is a senior lecturer in the Aberdeen University 
Centre for Energy Law, with a particular interest in oil and gas law and 
policy. At the conference, Greg Gordon discussed the UK framework 
for onshore licensing by also connecting it to issues of community 
interests. 
It is a great pleasure to speak at this conference and I would like to thank 
the organisers for their kind invitation for me to come and do so. I have 
been asked to speak on community interests in onshore oil and gas 
developments. In addressing this topic, I think it is important to locate 
the discussion in a somewhat broader context. A lot of the conference’s 
contributions have relied on renewables as a backdrop. The views 
expressed often seek to identify how much of the current policies on 
community benefits match - or will match - with the developments which 
are happening with onshore oil and gas - or are going to be happening in 
the future. 
That is a very valid perspective. But interestingly there are analogies, 
lessons, warnings and also disconnects to be seen when we look at 
offshore oil and gas. One aspect that has not been extensively referred 
to so far at this event is the offshore licensing regime. The UK is more 
familiar with the offshore regime as – while of course there have 
been some onshore activities, stretching back for many years – the 
overwhelming majority of oil and gas operations in the UK are carried out 
offshore. So, this contribution will include some views on the offshore 
framework as it is interesting to look at the licensing regime, the main 
players and to identify to what extent it is similar or dissimilar to the 
onshore context. Here, unconventionals and fracking will be given some 
attention broadly as quite a lot of that study has already been covered. 
America shall serve as an example even though America may appear 
to be a misleading example when compared to the UK. But it will be 
important to look at least at the concept of “living with shale” as this reality 
helps understand the impact that this industry potentially has on the 
environment and people’s day to day lives. “How we regulate” flows, or 
should flow, directly from the reality of this impact.
 
This presentation will also include some discussion of the law. In relation 
to community interests, it is probably best described as a practice that is 
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beginning to emerge through ministerial statements and statements from 
the industry. These approaches will be compared with the position that 
has traditionally existed offshore. 
When looking at licensing, it is important to look in high level at the key 
features of the offshore regime and its players. Thinking back to Professor 
Anita Rønne’s earlier contribution to this conference, it can be said as a 
preliminary comment that there is quite a lot of similarity between the 
licensing regime in Denmark and the UK. 
In the UK continental shelf (UKCS), the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC) acts as the central government’s organisation 
to the upstream oil and gas industry. A very interesting interim report 
from Sir Ian Wood was released right before this conference.17 Among 
other things, it notably proposed to identify whether DECC fulfils its role 
properly and efficiently, or whether its tasks are becoming too much of 
a challenge, and if it now needs to take radically a different approach. 
We will have to see what the final report says and the extent to which 
it receives political backing.18 This system rests on a state’s claim of 
sovereignty over oil and gas resources in the UKCS - and not one of 
“ownership”. DECC administers the law and practices with the help of 
various other environmental authorities. Where there is competition 
between prospective licensees for a piece of acreage, DECC decides on 
where it will go.19 The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is also one of 
the important department that is consulted by DECC. In addition, there is 
some degree of consultation with interested sea users. For example, the 
fishing industry is consulted on issues like legacy liability and the areas 
to be utilised. Equally, the Ministry of Defence is consulted and is very 
influential.
17The Interim Report of the Wood review was published on 11 November 2013 
and can be accessed at http://www.woodreview.co.uk/documents/UKCS_
Maximising_Recovery_Review_Interim_Report_11.11.13_LOCKED.PDF. 
18The Final Report was published on 24 February 2014 and can be accessed 
at http://www.woodreview.co.uk/documents/UKCS%20Maximising%20
Recovery%20Review%20FINAL%2072pp%20locked.pdf. It did receive political 
backing; it was immediately accepted by government and industry. At time of 
writing, the process of implementing Wood has begun: see e.g. the Infrastructure 
Act 2015 ss 41-42.
19The fundamental of the system will survive the Wood reforms, but will in the 
future be exercised not by DECC but by a new, arms-length, industry funded 
regulator, the Oil and Gas Authority (OGA).
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One important aspect for the purposes of looking offshore is that, unlike 
onshore, there is no private property system in the UKCS. There are 
private property rights within the territorial sea, but not for the continental 
shelf beyond. Of course, offshore operations pose technical challenges. 
But from the perspective of the legal environment, the relative absence of 
vested property rights greatly simplifies matters. 
Another important aspect is that the majority of the offshore activity 
takes place “beyond the horizon”. Rigs and the installations are all a 
long way away from the shore. Some pipelines or parts of infrastructure 
come closer to the shore and bring in oil and gas to the land but the 
overwhelming majority of the installations or the activities that are taking 
place in the North Sea or West of Shetland are well away from sight. 
There are some exceptions, but this picture is true for the overwhelming 
majority of the installations and infrastructure. I think that this distance 
may have contributed to the attitude that the public has to its primary 
energy supplies in this country. We have become accustomed to the idea 
that energy will just be there, with no visible adverse impact upon the 
environment or how we live our lives. Like an over-indulged child, we 
have become “spoiled”. And the remoteness of offshore infrastructure 
raises an interesting question: if one wants to talk about community 
interest in this context, which community are we talking about? Are we 
talking about a community which is close to where the pipeline joins the 
land? Or are we talking about a community that is close to a refinery or 
an oil terminal? A community that sends workers offshore? Or in this 
context, is there no meaningful community at all (beyond those employed 
to work on the offshore installation producing the oil) simply because no 
one else lives there? 
The last of these possibilities is the way this issue has generally been 
looked at in the offshore context.
 
Shetland has been successful in obtaining a direct share of oil and gas 
revenue through a levy on oil that is landed at Sullom Voe. The Shetland 
Charitable Trust has been the driver for that purpose and has accumulated 
a substantial fund. This trust now funds a variety of social and cultural 
activities and is also seeking to fund renewables projects. But other 
than with the Shetland’s initiative, there has been no recognition of the 
derivation principle. While places like Dundee, Aberdeen, and Peterhead 
have considerably benefitted from being involved in the oil and gas 
industry, these benefits have been indirect by providing employment and 
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business. Aberdeen’s civil infrastructures like the roads and the industrial 
estates have also developed in order to accommodate this flourishing 
industry. In the past, there were suggestions from the Grampian Regional 
Council that it should secure some [oil] money to get this development 
done. The message from central government was however that Aberdeen 
would benefit from business rates when the businesses were up and 
running, but it would get no direct share of oil revenue. Of course, there 
was a time-lag between the point when the infrastructure needed to the 
build and the point when the anticipated increase in council income, 
through business rates, could come. In the end, some loans were put in 
place in order to allow the construction of this infrastructure. These were 
subsequently paid back. So there was no direct support from the offshore 
industry and this suggests that “community interest” is not a particularly 
relevant concept in the offshore context.
Turning onshore, what we see is quite similar to the Danish example. 
Onshore oil and gas development is a much more complex picture. A 
state claim of ownership - not just sovereign rights - is made in relation to 
onshore oil and gas in strata. The claim does not extend to the overlying 
land. The overlying land continues to be owned by whoever is the legal 
owner. The Department of Energy and Climate Change also acts as the 
licensing authority onshore. The license is still important in an onshore 
context, but it is not as pivotal as it is offshore. There are a lot of other 
consents and interests that make the complex environment of onshore 
licensing. The Health and Safety Executive and Environmental Agency 
also play a role in this process. Licences are needed for groundwater 
abstraction; air quality has to be monitored. Also, part of onshore gas 
production is the association of the areas where there is coal. Hence, it 
is necessary to sort out the working relation between the Coal Authority 
and the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC). Issues arise, 
such as: what is going to be the order of development; do we get the 
gas first, then the coal; which body has the ability to licence such specific 
item? The Coal Authority can feed into this onshore process but it does 
not act as the licensing authority in relation to oil and gas.
 
There also has to be compliance with mining laws with respect to things 
like onshore borehole sinking. The mining requirements are not especially 
difficult or onerous to comply with and they will not necessarily obstruct 
oil and gas development, but in administrative terms it is another set of 
hurdles to cross.
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Onshore activities are certainly affected by private property rights. This is 
the biggest difference compared to offshore development. If a developer 
wants to get access to a land to develop oil and gas related activity then, 
it will not be enough to hold a petroleum license. The developer must 
secure some sort of commercial deal with the overlying land owner so 
that they can get a physical access for their installation. 
Planning law is a very powerful and important tool, too. An interesting, 
yet atypical, example can be found in the Orkney Local Plan which led 
to the blocking of uranium development in Orkney in the early 1980s. 
The British Geological Survey found a rich and commercially viable 
seam of uranium near to Stromness in Orkney. There was considerable 
enthusiasm on the part of government for that resource to be developed, 
and also considerable enthusiasm on the part of at least one major mining 
company. The project caused a lot of local discontent and national 
protests. Consequently, the local plan was redrafted to accommodate 
prohibition on uranium mining. As a result, an inquiry was necessary 
before the development could take place. In the end the development 
did not proceed, in part because of this and in part because of a drop in 
the price of uranium. So, local opposition and action plan came together 
to help stall that particular development. Yet planning is more subtle than 
the binary “stop/go” question of whether a development is permitted 
or prohibited. As Mr Robert Gray discussed in his presentation to this 
conference, planning can also involve micromanagement of a particular 
project. It helps provide a much more granular consideration of the 
particular effects of a particular project for a community. Therefore, local 
planning turns out to be an effective and powerful tool.
Currently, there is some small scale conventional onshore production in 
the UKCS. A lot of the oil produced from the onshore area is produced at 
Wytch Farm in Dorset. Other smaller developments exist like in the North 
of Scotland. There are some interesting developments where people with 
onshore licences are drilling onshore whereas the assets and oil and gas 
that they are reaching are actually some distance offshore, and they are 
conducting their activities through directional drilling. 
The overall onshore licensing regime for conventionals is also used in 
relation to unconventionals. It is supplemented by some additional and 
specific guidance which we will discuss later, but the essential legal 
framework is the same. Very much like in Denmark, British policy makers 
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have not yet come up with a particularly detailed framework for shale gas 
and unconventional fuel opportunities.
Why might we need such a framework? Perhaps I should say a few words 
about what is shale gas. What is the fundamental difference between 
shale and conventional gas? A conventional reservoir is characterised 
by porous, permeable rock. So the rock is essentially a structure made 
of big spaces between the particles. Within those spaces accumulate 
hydrocarbons or other elements like water. Further migration is prevented 
by a cap rock which forms a trap and therefore gas is accumulated within 
that particle space. Shale gas reservoirs have a much lower permeability 
and porosity, so they are made of more tightly packed rocks. The low 
porosity means that the recovery is lower by volume than conventional 
reservoirs and it means that hydrocarbons will not flow as naturally 
from these sorts of formations. Ultimately, these conditions mean that 
operators have to work harder to get the gas out. So, one thing that needs 
to be remembered is that this resource requires more intensive operations 
than does production from conventional reservoirs.
What can we learn from the American experience on shale gas 
exploration? The Prime Minister would say, a lot. In The Telegraph 
newspaper’s issue of the 11th August 2013, David Cameron expressed 
his very pro-fracking views. He said: “just look at the United State, they 
have tens of thousands of fracking well coming up each year and their gas 
prices are three and a half times lower than in the UK. It doesn’t matter if 
we are in the north of the country, the south of the country, we are all in 
this vision together”. His views imply that the prime minister is in favour 
of fracking and that the public can expect to see a US-style drop in prices 
if we press on with it.20 This is, I think, a very Conservative approach to 
making a case for fracking and shale gas: meeting concerns about safety 
20A leading commentator, Professor Jim Watson, however later published an 
article in the Daily Telegraph saying “David Cameron was wrong to raise the 
public’s hopes that fracking could lead to a significant fall in energy bills.” 
Later Government pronouncements on the topic – although still positive about 
unconventionals – were rather more circumspect in stating the economic case that 
the Prime Minister had been. See e.g. HM Treasury, “Harnessing the potential of 





and environmental concerns by promising economic benefits. But is 
this realistic? How comparable is the US experience to what we might 
experience in the UK? 
One important area to consider is geology. The geological factors of the 
USA are different from those in the UK and Europe and it cannot be 
assumed that things that can be done in the USA can also be done in UK 
or Europe.
 
Geological factors mean that the depth of the gas is likely to be different 
for the UK and USA. The deeper the gas, the better it is for the 
environment because it will be further away from aquifers and the less 
chance there would seem to be of contamination. Hence, digging deep 
is not a bad thing. But the economic impact works the other way: the 
deeper the resource, the more difficult it is to get it as basins are smaller, 
reservoirs are less rich and the contents high in clay.
The human geographical factor is also an important factor here. If we 
compare the USA and UK, the UK is more densely populated than the 
USA. This gives the USA large amounts of open space for developments 
of drilling pads. This is not the picture (drilling pads) that the UK wants 
to see at regular intervals of the landscape but these establishments will 
end up being close to the communities. Due to the population’s density, 
shale gas establishments in the UK will I think inevitably face even greater 
opposition and scrutiny than those in the US. 
There is also difference between the UK and the USA in terms of 
industrial activities. As we have already discussed, the UK has a relatively 
small onshore drilling industry when compared against the USA, which 
has for a long time had a large-scale onshore oil and gas industry. The 
USA can easily re-deploy the large inventory of drilling rigs that are 
already present. In the UK, no such inventory exists. The supply chain 
will have to be created from scratch, as it was with wind. It is by no means 
impossible but it raises issues of cost and timing. For this reason alone, 
there is no prospect of a large-scale unconventionals industry springing 
up overnight and causing a collapse in consumer prices.
Legal considerations would militate against that, too. As we have already 
seen, here in the UK, the full right of property of oil and gas found 
underground is vested in the Crown. In the USA, there is no general State 
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claim made to property in oil and gas in situ. If developers are dealing with 
State-owned lands then the State owns the oil and gas found there; but 
if the land is privately owned, it is the owner of the land who owns the oil 
and gas. So the company wishing to develop the asset contracts with the 
owner to secure access to it. One of the factors that led to the reduction 
in prices in the USA is due to the nature of the legal arrangements that 
is entered between the companies seeking to get access to shale gas 
and the various land owners who own the resource land. Land owners 
entered into option agreements with operators where they had to start 
producing as soon as possible to generate revenue within a reasonable 
timeframe. The various onshore companies acquired interests in the 
land but subject to fairly strict obligations. One of the obligations was to 
produce the resource swiftly. Operators could not just acquire acreages 
and sit on them. That contributed to a massive glut of supply hitting the 
market at the same time. As a consequence, these arrangements caused 
the market price to drop. This development also explains that LNG 
facilities that were supposed to be for import have been reconverted so 
that they become operational for exports. The plan is to take the excess 
of gas out of the USA. This scenario also had an impact on coal where 
it is now being exported out of the USA and to places like Germany 
who tend to position themselves as champions of “moving towards low 
carbon.” The foregoing considerations show how the local regime of 
ownership can make a big difference on the industry’s future shape and 
development. Also, gas markets are not identical and do not behave in 
the same way in Europe and the USA.
If we now look at the prospect of “living with shale”, what is the impact 
of shale gas exploration and production? Addressing this question leads 
to consider some items which relate specifically to shale gas while other 
items are not specific and instead relate to living with any oil and gas 
development reasonably close to residents.
 
Fracking is one of the specific features of shale gas development. What 
does it entail? Well as we know it involves deliberately fracturing strata 
underground. As Professor Rønne has already indicated fracking entails 
a significant utilisation of water. This consumption of water has a broad 
range of knock-on effects. For instance, in the United States, a lot of 
complaints and concerns about fracking have been voiced. Specifically, 
one aspect that certainly poses a major problem in parts of the USA is 
the transportation of water. In parts of rural Pennsylvania where fracking 
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operations were undertaken, communities found distressing the fact 
that the road usage changed so significantly. Fracking comes with a 
constant stream of heavy haulage transporting equipment to the site. 
The communities did not anticipate this kind of new road usage, where 
vast quantities of water and equipment would be transported. They did 
not anticipate that this heavy road usage was to continue over prolonged 
periods of time. Transportation of water will not necessarily be required at 
all sites. This depends on the extent water can be locally abstracted. But 
when water is having to be road-hauled it makes an enormous difference 
to the number of vehicle movements. This is not necessarily one of the 
big-ticket issues we would first think about when we considered the 
disadvantages of shale development. But experience suggests that for 
some communities, at least, it can be a very major issue.
Also, the well structure must prevent the escape of underground gas 
and liquids and any ingress into aquifers. The idea of using high pressure 
water and additives and breaking open rocks underground with the 
help of fracking fluids based on undisclosed composition is a matter of 
concern for many people. A series of different kinds of additives get into 
the water to make the process as efficient as possible. These mixtures 
have a certain intellectual property dimension and operators are rather 
wary of saying precisely what their fracking fluids contain. They view this 
as a proprietorial formula which they do not wish to make public. Apart 
from these concerns the fracking process also has issue about noise, 
light pollution, vibrations associated with drilling. The overall safety of 
the fracking installation is also a matter of concern. A gas production 
phase can go on for a very long time, stretching on for decades, albeit the 
highest levels of production are usually seen in the initial period. 
The big risk that has certainly caught the public imagination in the UK, 
so far, has been seismic risk. The idea that these operations are going 
to cause earthquakes is something that has been a source for concern. 
The reason for seismic risk having caught the UK public’s imagination 
due to a relatively small, magnitude three, earthquake that was triggered 
by fracking operations in Lancashire. Seismic risk is a type of risk that 
inhabitants are simply not used to in this country. We are fortunate 
enough to live in a very stable geological area. “I might get caught in an 
earthquake today” is not a thought that enters into one’s mind in the UK. 
As a result, our reaction to what was, in reality, a very minor seismic event 
has been rather disproportionate. There has been a significant response 
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to the mini-earthquake in Lancashire by the government in setting out, in 
guidance, how it is going to regulate these activities and prevent seismic 
risk potentially associated with fracking.
Unconventional exploration and production also need to think about well 
decommissioning. Here there is a more long term concern than in relation 
to other sources of energy like onshore wind. In case of windmills, if 
the project comes to the end of its natural life, then the installation just 
requires to be taken away. Obviously, there is a physical exercise involved 
in the removal of these installations and once removed it is gone forever. 
But for the decommissioning of a well, people express more concern. 
They want to understand what will be the impact over a long term and 
make sure that beyond periods of twenty or thirty years there will be no 
risk of methane percolating up the rocks and through aquifers.
With the above background in mind which highlights a number of issues, 
what is therefore the UK’s approach to unconventionals? For a start, this 
country began to move on unconventionals through a cautious approach 
that resulted in a moratorium. There was a short term moratorium 
after the unpredicted seismic activity during the Lancashire fracking in 
2011. This moratorium is now over and in December 2012, the DECC 
confirmed in a written statement to parliament that they were willing to 
see fracking resume.21 As mentioned above, the policy-maker’s approach 
is to first look at the general law, i.e. the existing law on onshore oil and 
gas development, to govern fracking activities. This general framework 
should be supplemented by a relatively small number of other specific 
requirements. Probably as a direct result of the Lancashire experience, 
such specific requirements generally revolve around seismic risks. 
Going back to the specific items of regulation which have been bolted 
on top of the general law, these include a prior review of seismic 
data to identify hazards and assess risks. For instance, in relation to a 
particular site, an assessment needs to be done for existing fractures, 
and underlying geological features that would give the regulator cause 
for concern. If so, the regulator will consider them and the operator will 
have to submit a fracking plan to the DECC for approval. In order to draw 
21Since this presentation, the Scottish Government has separately imposed a 
moratorium on fracking, pending a public consultation exercise. 
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this fracking plan, the operator shall have to take into account all the 
information it found through the prior review it conducted. The DECC 
will monitor seismic data on an on-going basis. There will be a traffic light 
system that will allow the DECC to halt operations if seismic activity goes 
beyond a certain threshold. In practice this threshold is effectively very 
low.22 
In the documents that have come out following the written ministerial 
statement on shale gas, there is an explicit recognition of public trust 
deficit. If the UK wants to move to shale, there is an explicit recognition 
of the need for UK to take the public on board for this project. This 
engagement cannot be imposed on the public from above. There has 
been some recognition by politicians of the need to build trust around 
shale gas by listening to the public and their concerns. This approach 
connects with Dr Parkhill’s conclusions as discussed in her presentation 
around the shaping of our future energy systems and the values of the 
public would like to see reflected in them. Building trust rests notably on 
the on-going initiatives such as the Strategic Environmental Assessment 
(SEA) recently conducted in anticipation of future onshore developments 
in the UK. This SEA had been already going on at the time the seismic 
problems with the Lancashire fracking took place. The Health Protection 
Agency is also involved to monitor effects on health risks and air quality in 
particularly.
The industry’s perspective on these issues was put forward by Lord 
Browne, the former chief executive of BP who is now the chairman 
of Cuadrilla Resources Holdings Ltd. Lord Browne says that there is a 
complexity “that we are all used to, but that should be simplified. This 
is about streamlining with certainty but making sure it is as simple as 
possible, and doing it speedily. Right now there is neither speed nor 
certainty. We need to speed things up.” 
This statement transcribes a perfectly legitimate industry perspective. Any 
industry wants regulatory certainty. They do not wish to see processes 
being unnecessarily Byzantine. If they are convinced that what they are 
doing is perfectly lawful and good - and their operations are going to 
make a contribution to UK’s energy security and to the government’s 
22For further details, see https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/written-
ministerial-statement-by-edward-davey-exploration-for-shale-gas.
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coffers - then that is perfectly logical. This statement, however, is slightly 
antagonistic when considered by a public that is – to put it mildly - rather 
sceptical about all of this. It sounds like an industry that is trying to 
rush things through. Yet it is not irrational. It is not “wrong”, but it is a 
message that may create some problems from the perspective of public 
perception, even if it is one that government endorses. The Secretary 
of State for Energy & Climate Change has indicated that “we’re going to 
try to streamline; we’re going to try to get a more transparent regulatory 
process.” As of today, is there any sign of that streamlining exercise 
happening? Recently, the United Kingdom’s government announced 
the introduction of quite an advantageous tax regime which is more 
generous in relation to unconventional gas than to other conventional 
onshore developments.23 There are also some proposed changes to 
English planning law which were issued in September 2013. These 
relate specifically to the provision of notices to overlying landowners. 
When fracking takes place, cracks in the rocks can travel for quite a 
long distance. So if there is an obligation to notify everybody whose 
land might lie above those fissures, can such identification be practically 
feasible? Secondly, operators may have to individually notify a long list 
of individuals for no great purpose. So that is the sort of change that 
probably does serve a legitimate purpose – but also the sort of change 
that a sceptical public will view with suspicion as politicians “speeding the 
plough” for industry.24
Turning to community interest more specifically, it is important to consider 
the existing situation with conventional hydrocarbon resources. The 
person who happens to own the land in a conventional onshore oil and 
gas development, the overlying landowner, will typically enter into a 
commercial agreement to permit access to an operator or a driller. Yet, 
there is no broader community interest recognised in conventional 
development and certainly no legal obligation in that respect.
23This quotation is taken from an interview with the Guardian newspaper, published 
on 12 March 2013: see http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/
mar/12/lord-browne-uk-shale-gas.
24Since this presentation was given, further streamlining has taken place. We 
have seen the creation of the Office of Unconventional Gas and Oil (OUGO), an 
administrative department of DECC, and the controversial introduction, in England 
and Wales, of a statutory right to use land in the deep sub-surface for energy 
exploitation purposes, without the need to secure the permission of the overlying 
owner: see the Infrastructure Act 2015, s.43. 
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In relation to unconventionals, the situation is now slightly different. Here 
again, the overlying land owner can seek to get some sort of reward for 
use of his land. It is understandable that he or she would seek to capitalise 
some value by leasing the land; but of itself, that enriches one “lucky” 
landowner and gives rise to no broader community benefit, despite the 
fact the effects of development may ramify more broadly. On the 27th of 
June 2013, the industry pledged to engage effectively with communities 
and offer what one could call “a bounty”. This offer was made by the 
industry25 but announced by the UK government: the government 
announced it alongside a document which gave some sort of indication 
of future potential for unconventional developments in the UK.26 So the 
government is pushing this initiative forward and tacitly suggesting that 
this is a good thing. This approach suggests the interrelationship between 
the community, the industry and government. Whether the community 
will accept the role of government as “honest broker” is a moot point.27 
The undertaking from the industry suggests that it must engage openly 
and honestly with communities. The government also indicates that 
evidence of such engagement and its extent shall be published. This 
approach is rather similar to the one discussed on the first day of this 
conference in relation to renewables: the idea is that openness is part of 
the answer; not rigid rules; not heavy intervention by the government. 
An industry speaking to communities in an open atmosphere is what 
is needed to move this project forward. The government’s statement 
was slightly ambiguous on what precisely the bounty is going to be. 
It first indicated that there was going to be at least £100,000 paid for 
each hydraulically fracked well. Later on, this amount was payable for 
each hydraulically fracked well site. In practice, the two things are very 
25The Charter can be downloaded from http://www.ukoog.org.uk/community/
charter.
26DECC Press Release, Estimates of shale gas resource in North of England 
published, alongside a package of community benefits, available at https://www.
gov.uk/government/news/estimates-of-shale-gas-resource-in-north-of-england-
published-alongside-a-package-of-community-benefits.
27One of the lessons of the Brent Spar incident is that the public may be deeply 
suspicious when the Government and Industry come together to “push” a certain 
outcome. For an account of Brent Spar, see J Paterson, Decommissioning of 
Offshore Oil and Gas Installations, in G Gordon, J Paterson and E Usenmez, Oil and 
Gas Law: Current Practice and Emerging Trends, Dundee University Press, 2nd Ed, 
2011, paras 10.17-10.34.
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different. There may be many wells within one well site. So, supposing 
that the payment is done according to the second interpretation then 
there will be £100,000 payable per site, not per well. To add to it, at least 
1% revenue from all production sites should go to local communities: 2/3 
to the area most immediately effected and 1/3 “at the county level”. This 
is a very important development as it is the first time that communities 
are being given the opportunity to gain some share in oil and gas wealth 
in direct way - and beyond what the Shetlands were able to secure from 
the industry as a result of their geographical location and the strength 
of their bargaining position. It introduces a new approach in oil and gas 
exploration and production in the UK. And it is for unconventionals only.
This new policy does raise questions identical to the ones discussed by 
this conference around community ownership and community interest. 
First of all, what is the community? That fundamental definitional problem 
arises with this new benefits regime. There is also an issue of legal 
enforceability. The Charter is a public declaration of intent. In and of itself, 
it would seem to be of no legal effect whatsoever, at least in England and 
Wales.28 However, these benefits could be used to form the basis of a 
binding agreement between a particular operator and a host community 
in a particular development. Or indeed, if the state wants to throw its 
weight behind this and make it legally enforceable, there is nothing to 
stop the government from writing such benefits requirement into either 
the model licence terms or writing them into individual licence terms. The 
licence is a regulatory instrument in contractual form. Third party rights 
can be enforced in both Scots law and the law of England and Wales,29 so 
the British government could create enforceable third-party rights under 
the framework of the licence, if it decided so to do.
Conversely, at this stage there is no indication of a drive to encourage 
community ownership. Instead, the framework will provide a sort of 
diverted revenue stream as opposed to community ownership in the 
project. It is interesting to contrast this with the approach that the 
28Unilateral promises are not enforceable under the law of England and Wales. 
They are enforceable under certain conditions in Scots law; however it may be 
doubted if the commitments are expressed with sufficient clarity to be legally 
enforceable. 
29 In Scots law, under the common law doctrine of jus quaesitum tertio; in the law of 
England and Wales, as a result of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.
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conference has been exploring in relation to renewables. In the case of 
renewables the community ownership is seen as preferable to a diverted 
revenue stream. What about onshore oil and gas developments? We 
should be careful not to blithely assume that the same approach will be 
best in that context. The risk profile of the two types of development 
is different. Investments are potentially risky and involve experimental 
developments, at least now, in the early days of the development of the 
industry.30 It would not seem advisable that community invest heavily 
in the first wave of unconventional developments as they might go 
seriously wrong and communities would have to face the consequences 
of speculative investments. The risk profile in these sorts of development 
is quite different from the risk profile in well-proven wind technology with 
a relatively stable regulatory environment where investors also know how 
likely their generators will benefit from some wind at a particular stage.
There are also a host of other factors that would influence investments 
in onshore developments. Such factors are not unique to the oil and gas 
industry. They notably include how much noise are local communities 
willing to tolerate? How much traffic movement are they willing to 
tolerate at the time the equipment will be constructed, developed and 
maintained? Also, how much damage are they willing to tolerate to the 
visual amenity? These are just some of the issues that may arise and 
there may be more to come. People worry about environmental impacts 
like water contamination, air quality, the idea of some sort of long 
term problem or liability rearing up perhaps years after production has 
stopped. A bounty does not necessarily make these fears go away. It is 
not a simple trade off of the loss of a known amount of e.g. visual amenity 
for a certain amount of money. We are dealing in less determinate 
outcomes. Maybe these things will go wrong; maybe not. If they do, the 
consequences may be acute. A non-binding pledge that all operators 
carry insurance may not be enough. It begs questions: what kind of 
30Quite apart from the specific risks associated with shale oil and gas development, 
the industry is of course – like the conventional oil and gas industry – exposed 
to the risk of price crash. In November 2013, oil price stood at around $106 per 
barrel. Now, as the proofs of this chapter are being prepared for press, it stands at 
$66. The price of gas has followed suit.
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insurance? Is it adequate? Who is taking oversight of this?31 What can I do 
if the pledge is breached? These fear factors can work against investment. 
Perhaps one way to deal with this situation, especially if the government 
really wants the UK to support onshore unconventional oil and gas, would 
be to incentivise investment by stating that the government will take just 
some or all of potential liabilities away from investors. The government 
could pledge to pay generous compensation if things go wrong with 
onshore developments. I have to say it shows no interest in so doing 
at the moment, but it is a point that I think local communities can quite 
legitimately make. “Why should we take the risk? If you think this is such 
a good idea, in the national interest, then under-write it. Put your money 
where your mouth is.”
So, it is difficult to assess at this stage if the current package of community 
benefits supported by the government is going to be enough to enhance 
the expansion of an onshore unconventional gas industry. Apart from 
the framework discussed in this presentation, there is also potential 
for more individual negotiation. The pledge talks of benefits being “at 
least” as discussed above. A well-advised community might in certain 
circumstances be able to drive a harder bargain. Considering the 
communities’ interests and thinking in terms of their peoples’ fears, 
adding some incentives may very well be needed if the country is going 
to push this resource on. Perhaps more could be done in the way of 
government intervention – not just pushing the industry offer, but saying, 
we understand your fears, and we will guarantee that you will have 
concrete help if things go wrong. 
 
31The Scottish Coal debacle demonstrates that significant sophistication and 
expertise is required of any regulator given the task of assessing the usefulness 
of a financial product procured by the industry for the benefit of third parties. 
See e.g. East Ayrshire Council, Opencast Mining in East Ayrshire – Steps to 








Professor Peter Strachan has been teaching and researching at 
Aberdeen Business School for the past twenty one years. Professor 
Strachan’s first ten academic years primarily focused on oil and gas. 
Since 2003, he has been working on renewables and energy policy. 
Professor Strachan has published an extensive range of papers in 
planning journals and journals such as Regional Studies discussing 
the UK’s experience with wind power deployments. Based on this 
expertise, Professor Strachan’s presentation focused on aspects 
of community benefits and their provision as part of wind farm 
developments in Scotland. His presentation also discussed the 
findings that he worked out of a recent survey of local governments’ 
role and actions to deliver a low carbon energy future.
The interest of discussing the role of local governments at a conference 
such as this one stems from three key reasons. The first is that local 
government has got a fundamental role to play in the transition to 
a low carbon economy. The role of local government in sustainable 
development and energy cannot be overstated. Secondly, planners such 
as Robert Grey, who also addressed this conference, have really been 
at the forefront of wind power deployment in the United Kingdom. So 
the wind power planning process, and how to engage with the general 
public, appears to be a big area of study that has, by all accounts, largely 
been neglected. Thirdly, local governments are also very important in 
terms of local history, heritage, environmental protection, landscape 
management, all of which predate in Scotland the Industrial Revolution by 
hundreds of years.
 
This presentation will show how local governments are performing a 
key role in terms of achieving this country’s transition to a low carbon 
economy. It will be broken down primarily into three key areas. Firstly, 
what it will set the scene for its subject matter and findings. It will provide 
background information about its author and how I came to work in 
this particular area. This presentation will also outline some of the 
controversies attached to community benefits provisions in the United 
Kingdom. Professor Rønne, in her contribution delivered on day one, 
introduced the conference to the very creative and innovative approaches 
that Denmark has taken to this whole issue of community participation, 
community ownership and community benefits. Unfortunately, the United 
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Kingdom is standing many years behind the Danish energy system. 
Secondly, this presentation will seek to explain the principle aim of a 
recent survey we recently conducted and which supports our findings. I 
will also say just a few words about our methodology. 
Thirdly, this presentation will highlight five key findings arising from the 
study we carried out. These may prove to be particularly relevant to 
planning departments and economic development experts in Scotland.
The research underlying this presentation is the result of a distinct strand 
of work with a number of different pieces that have been undertaken 
during the past ten years or so. This research was funded through three 
economic and social research councils’ grants. In the past I have also 
done studies for the Welsh Assembly Government and I have published 
a couple of books in the area. I have also published a large number of 
papers on issues related to wind power and wind power deployment.32 
In addition to this particular piece of research, I started a new project in 
December 2013 with a company called Sea Energy. The purpose of this 
study structured around a knowledge transfer partnership, is to focus on 
the deployment of offshore wind farms by primarily looking at offshore 
maintenance and the supply chain to support offshore developments. 
After a close examination of available research material, I came to 
the conclusion that very little is published on local government and 
its perspectives on wind power. David Toke, who also addressed the 
conference, published some interesting research on the planning 
process in England and how planning applications are being dealt with 
at that point. It appeared, therefore, interesting to survey all of the local 
32Professor Strachan’s book “Wind Power and Wind Power Politics, International 
Perspectives” was published by Routledge in 2010. It provides an international 
perspective on community benefits provision across the world. It features cases 
studies of countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, the United States 
and includes, for example, a review of the Minnesota model that operates in the 
United States. This publication provides one of the most definitive accounts of 
community ownership issues around the world. Professor Strachan also published 
another book with Palgrave Macmillan in 2012 which seeks to share the experience 
of wind power deployment around the world and apply its findings to some 
other emerging technologies such as marine renewables. This recent publication 
proposes to draw out some of the lessons learnt from wind power and sees how 
they could apply to other forms of renewable energy technologies.
84
authorities in Scotland in an attempt to try to determine what are “best 
practices” when it comes to publishing formal policy statements on 
community benefits provisions. After undertaking the survey, the next 
part of the research implied interviewing key planning officials as well as 
people working in economic development in an attempt to build a picture 
of best practices or, perhaps, the lack of such practices in Scotland. 
The result of this research brought about some shocking findings. 
Typically, apart from a handful of very good examples of community 
benefits practices, most local authorities in Scotland do not have any 
formal policy guidance at all when it comes to community benefits 
provisions. This picture transpires despite ten years of significant 
expansion of wind power and other renewable energy technologies in the 
United Kingdom. At the time of the conference, the majority of councils 
within Scotland did not have any form of policy guidance at all, or at least 
none that they could share with the wider public.
During the past ten to twelve years, the United Kingdom has seen 
significant expansion in terms of installed wind power capacity. Prior 
to 2002, there was virtually no wind power capacity in the United 
Kingdom. Much of the wind power capacity is now located in the 
devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. In 
terms of contribution to the UK’s renewable energy targets, the devolved 
administrations are playing an important and significant role. After 2002, 
we saw a rapid development of these energy sources. Such a progression 
coincided with the development of the UK’s “renewables obligation” 
which started to provide some rather generous level of financial support 
for the deployment of renewable energy generators. This policy 
instrument caused a big rush of the major players in the UK market. The 
“Big Six”, the major energy players in the UK, were very quick to build 
wind farms such as Whitelee or Clyde. Clyde and Whitelee are two of the 
largest onshore wind farms in Europe with a capacity ranging from 300 to 
400 megawatts. The Scottish government has also introduced a target of 
100% electricity generation through renewables by 2020 which is one of 
the most ambitious targets anywhere in the world. Quite interestingly, a 
number of people who came to speak at the Aberdeen Business School 
in recent years have suggested that target is just unachievable. I have a 
different view and support that this target is very achievable. If Scotland 
sees the rates of deployment that it has seen to date continue, then that 
target will be achievable. Also, when the Scottish government does talk 
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about this target, it also talks about “equivalent”. Such an approach will 
help achieve the target in terms of electricity generation. Scotland also 
exports 25 to 30% of its electricity. But the key for Scotland to reach that 
target will be to achieve a significant level of offshore development. 
Over the years, the successive Scottish governments have been 
supporting wind power and renewable energy. Since devolution, pretty 
much all political parties’ manifestos have contributed to an increasing 
cross-party support for the rapid expansion of renewable energy 
in the UK. Part of the rationale behind this support is that the wind 
industry can be a driver for more economic development in Scotland. 
Economic development has provided a key rationale for the expansion 
of renewable energy sources (RES) in Scotland. Looking at some of 
the data on renewable energy capacity available for Northern Ireland, 
Wales, and England, it is also easy to notice an upward trend in terms 
of RES deployment across England and other devolved administrations. 
This information conveys a key practical message: what does it mean 
for planners? What does it mean in terms of buildings, fields or other 
forms of sites? In 2013, the UK’s renewables energy database indicated 
that there was more than 480 wind power projects operating in the 
United Kingdom. There are more than 4,000 wind turbines erected 
across the UK. There is little less than 7,000 megawatts of installed wind 
power capacity in the United Kingdom today. These numbers are really 
becoming quite significant when considering that they are only reflecting 
onshore wind farm developments. For the UK, achieving its “2020 target” 
will fundamentally depend on offshore deployment. This is going to be a 
key element. Yet, it is also one of the disappointing chapters of the recent 
electricity market reform, as this reform has created a hiatus. There are 
question marks over investment decisions as this policy has slowed down 
development and knocked down business confidence. 
Investors and companies such as Centrica need to make decisions not 
only for five years’ time but also for ten years’ time and fifteen years’ time. 
Investors in energy companies are looking for certainty in the market. 
They are looking for long term commitments on the new “Contracts for 
Difference” which will replace the “Renewables Obligation”. So clear and 
stable targets with long-term objectives are essential for the development 
of energy sources and for developing an enabling environment for the 
industry, so that it can operate and deliver on these targets. 
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On the first day of the conference, Professor Rønne drew a thorough 
picture of ownership issues in Denmark where significant cooperative 
ownership schemes pretty much dominate the landscape of wind farm 
property in Denmark. Denmark remains one of the shining examples of 
renewable energy deployment in Europe.
In the United Kingdom, a different picture is now emerging in terms 
of ownership issues. There has been a preference for large wind farm 
developments in Scotland which are corporately-owned by the main 
utility companies which operate within the United Kingdom. All wind 
power is not owned by the major utilities in the United Kingdom. Several 
very successful examples of cooperatives exist, such as the Boyndie 
wind farm located fifty five miles from Aberdeen, in Banffshire. However, 
in terms of deployment rate and when compared against the likes of 
Denmark and also Germany, there has only been a rapid development 
of wind farms during the past ten years as a result of the main policy 
support scheme, i.e. the “Renewables Obligation”. The literature tells 
us that much of the Danish model’s success is due to its capacity to 
engage. A high level of community acceptance exists as a result of the 
individual and cooperative ownership arrangements that operate in 
Denmark as well as in Germany. In itself, this statement could be regarded 
as an oversimplification of the picture. It would be wrong to state that 
ownership issues, individual and corporate ownership options do not play 
a significant role. These mechanisms certainly do. There is, however, a 
need to create engagement for public acceptance. There is also a whole 
host of other factors that energy policymakers need to pull to ensure that 
there is a strong domestic and international market for investment. One 
of the key factors, which is also reflected in the conclusions of the book I 
published in 2012 with Palgrave Macmillan, is that the existence of a long 
term political support is absolutely fundamental. It is vital and necessary.33
 
As part of this environment, the introduction of a strong and stable 
financial support scheme - such as a feed-in tariff that has been operating 
in other European countries - seems to be much more desirable than 
market-based instruments such as the CfD34 that the UK is about to 
introduce as part of its electricity market reform.
33Professor Strachan’s first book discusses the issue of community ownership. His 
second book focuses on some of the key market dynamics that must exist in order 
to achieve a successful renewable energy program.
34Contracts for Difference.
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The countries that have demonstrated the highest capacity to research 
and develop around these projects are Denmark and the Netherlands. 
Both countries started at the same time with ambitious business 
objectives when it came to renewable energy. The Danish experience 
started with small prototypes which helped demonstrate the relevance of 
this research and development. The Dutch took the opposite view in the 
1970s and 1980s and sought to build three 5 megawatt wind turbines. 
They could not, however, secure the technology and could not get it 
done at that point. 
If ownership and community arrangements are important, then other 
market conditions are also important in order to ensure that successful 
wind power and other renewable energy projects may be conducted. 
Today in the UK, several examples of good practice exist when it comes 
to community ownership or major energy projects were communities 
have a stake in the project.35
 
From the gist of the conversation shared on the first day of this 
conference, it appears that the public in the UK has less enthusiastic 
local communities. They are not quite embracing the energy transition 
that is taking place at the moment.36 For instance, individual ownership 
is significant in terms of solar panels and other recent initiatives but the 
numbers remain fairly small.37 Some of the studies we have conducted 
in the past suggest that there has been a deficit of trust among public, 
local communities, some developers, local and national government. In 
Scotland, local government comes under lot of criticism in terms of its role 
in determining wind power applications. That criticism may sometimes 
be qualified as pretty much unfair. Local government has been given a 
policy and remit. It is then asked to implement these. It also appears that 
there has also been some sort of deficit in trust between developers, local 
communities, local government and national government.
The panacea for many developers has been to offer a community 
benefits packages or, as we tend to argue, a “compensation package”, 
for communities having a wind farm or a group of wind turbines in 
35See, for instance, the projects piloted by the Energy 4 All group of cooperatives.
36Some of the reasons lie in the type of ownership arrangements which have 
developed around Scotland and the United Kingdom.
37The example of Boyndie given above is an exception to the rule.
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their locality. The research that we have conducted shows that some 
of the utilities’ community benefit packages demonstrate an attempt 
to try to foster more positive relationships with local communities. In 
addition to that, community benefits packages help in the process of 
securing planning decisions. So there are a number of reasons as to why 
community benefits packages are being offered. 
Interestingly, much of our research showed that the way we are 
formulating community benefits packages in the United Kingdom 
leads more to a placebo effect than the one of a panacea. In fact, many 
concerns have arisen as a result of community benefits packages. For 
example, they add an extra layer of complexity and bureaucracy in 
determining where a wind farm should or should not be built. In that 
respect, however, planners would tend to consider that community 
benefits are not a material consideration in the overall planning 
process. Equally, the concept of “community” is quite complex. Even 
the government literature available in Aberdeenshire, indicates that 
“community” can refer to communities of locality or communities of 
interest. Many wind farms also span across a number of different local 
authority or local government units. 
These situations have often resulted in not just one “community benefits 
fund” being created but several have been set up. Up until recently the 
level of financial benefits and the monetary value attached to community 
benefit packages had considerably varied. Looking a couple of years 
back, the average benefit award was around £1,700 per megawatt. 
Scottish Renewables, through various work led by Scottish and Southern 
Energy (SSE), were pretty much at the forefront of being the champions 
of a £5,000 per megawatt of installed capacity. Surprisingly, Renewables 
UK in the protocol they published about eighteen months ago was 
recommending a lowest common denominator amount of £1,000 per 
megawatt. By the same time, the average was exceeded and packages 
were more in the range of £1,700 to £2,000 per megawatt. These 
discrepancies leave a lot of room for discussion as to what the appropriate 
level of compensation might be when it comes to community benefit 
packages.
Going back to our piece of research, our focus was to look at formal 
policy guidance and documents produced by local authorities across 
Scotland in terms of understanding the advice they have been giving 
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to individuals and communities with respect to community benefits 
provision. We tried to determine what was effectively the best practice 
in Scotland in this area, and what the common picture was. The method 
that was used to underpin this work was an email survey of all Scottish 
local authorities that comprise local government within Scotland. Quite 
interestingly, we struggled in the first instance to actually determine to 
whom that email should be sent. Should it be sent to the head planner? 
Should it be addressed to economic development? This practical question 
was not easy to solve. Eventually we agreed that we would send it to the 
chief executive officer. In terms of response, the chief executive officers 
of each of the councils tended to delegate that task to their planners or 
economic development persons. Our sample targeted the entire available 
population. Half of that population that did respond treated our request 
as a freedom of information request. They not only provided formal 
policy documents but also other supplementary information such as 
minutes from council meetings and suchlike. This aspect of the response 
was in itself quite fascinating. We then followed up with a sample of 
representatives from selected Scottish local authorities, primarily those 
who had produced formal policy guidance documents, and then we 
spoke to them in a bit more depth in order to judge their rationale as to: 
why had they done that?; at what level should the various community 
benefits reach?; how were they defining the issue of community?; etc. 
We tried to explore all of those supplementary issues through a more 
thematic analysis of some interview transcripts. It confirmed that the issue 
of “community” in itself is a contested concept. Much of the supporting 
academic literature, and most local authorities in Scotland, really define 
the concept of community as a community of locality, i.e. those living 
nearest to a wind farm. But this definition comes with some of the 
complications discussed above. Community benefits provision in Scotland 
and the rest of the UK pretty much embrace a common approach in 
terms of: agreed payment index; inflation index; bonus paid in terms of 
wind farms output; additional one-off payment at the start or during the 
construction phase. This is also the approach adopted by SSE. This typical 
approach developed by the industry has led to define: what community 
benefits packages might fund; how the funds might be spent on – should 
it be spent on local facilities, sport equipment, social activities, educational 
activities or similar options? Some local authorities in Scotland have 
taken a more radical approach in terms of their definition of community 
and they have said “by community we mean everybody within the local 
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authority area. Community benefits provisions should be split amongst 
the entire local authority and should be used to support social housing 
projects and similar issues”. This is certainly just another way to think 
about the issue of community, yet it pretty much fundamentally reflects 
that “community” means those people living nearest to wind farm. This is 
also how many developers understand that issue. 
As introduced above, community benefits funds has varied between 
£2,000 to £5,000 per megawatt during the past eight years. We 
undertook work for the Welsh Assembly Government in 2008, and 
published a report with some colleagues at Cardiff University around 
these data which happen to reflect the ballpark figures identified for 2,000 
to 5,000-megawatt installations.
The established practice in Scotland is now to look at £5,000 per 
megawatt. It has already been mentioned in this presentation 
that Renewables UK, through their industry protocol, have been 
recommending £1,000 per megawatt per annum for community benefits 
allocation. Yet, the Scottish Renewables Forum has suggested that 
benefits should rather reach the higher figure of £5,000 per megawatt, 
a recommendation which is also reflected in their protocol with the 
industry’s key players.
Some stakeholders and communities have viewed these community 
benefits payments as bribes in order to secure planning decisions. They 
can also be understood as a compensation package. These issues have 
been discussed in a chapter of one of my books, “Learning from Wind 
Power”, in which the reader can find a wider discussion of community 
benefits provision across the UK. This work’s final conclusions is that 
community benefits provision, just as it happened in Denmark, might 
require a more formal and more legal position within the site’s decision 
process. At the moment community benefits must be regarded as an issue 
that is pretty separate from the overall planning process. As a result, they 
should not and cannot be treated as a consideration when dealing with a 
planning application.
Another research finding that arose from the work we conducted showed 
perhaps shockingly that most local authorities in Scotland do not have 
in place a formal policy on community benefits provision. It is hardly 
understandable that given ten years of rapid wind power deployment in 
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Scotland, there is still a majority of Scottish local councils being reactive to 
this whole debate. At the time of the conference, the scarce information 
available showed that Scottish councils were yet to get to grip with this 
debate. They do not have in place a formal policy for community benefits 
provision in terms of who holds power when it comes to community 
benefits provision and what sort of package might be available. These 
have been a secondary elements. It is the developers who have 
developed their own internal guidance; and it is the developers who 
hold power during the negotiation process. They have the financial clout, 
they have the legal expertise and they are dealing with an uncoordinated 
group of people. From my perspective and just based upon this particular 
finding, I think Scottish local government needs to get their acts together 
and need to be producing some standard formal guidance for operations 
across Scotland. A key player, in that process should, be the national 
Scottish government in order to provide the necessary steer in that 
particular direction. At the time of the conference, there was more than 
just a lack of consistent policy guidance and advice. There was just no 
policy and no guidance available. In terms of the rate of deployment 
and expansion during the past ten years, it has almost been as though 
the local government has been reactive and is now only about to catch 
up. There are however some really good examples of best practices. 
For instance, the Highlands Council have a very proactive approach 
to community benefits provisions. In many respects the Highlands 
Council has upset the developers on numerous occasions by its various 
statements and documents on community benefits provisions. They are 
also some interesting examples of joint venture and joint equity which 
have been promoted by some Scottish local authorities or councils. The 
picture is not all doom and there are examples of good practices. Yet, it 
does appear that Scottish councils need to be sitting together to bring 
about some more collaborative thinking in this specific area.
How can this dearth of policy initiatives on community benefits be 
explained? Some of the reasons for this reactive position lie in the fact 
that many local authorities lack resources. In some parts of Scotland, 
local councils are sometimes asked to deal with seven new wind power 
applications per day. Wind power applications are controversial as there 
is never an earlier application that can be used to install some new wind 
turbine or wind farm. Many local authorities have lacked the resource 
and time to put in place effective guidance. Again, this is where we 
feel that the national government needs to provide a more effective 
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steering when it comes to community benefits provision. This absence of 
national guidance has led to this inconsistent and fragmented approach 
to community benefits provision by local government. Councils have 
expressed concern about the overall planning process being corrupted 
when integrating community benefits packages into the overall planning 
decision. What remain material considerations are the environmental 
impact, the visual impact and a range of other factors. Community 
benefits provisions are not part of this overall picture. This is a major 
concern voiced by planners when it comes to understanding where 
does this issue of community benefits provision actually stand. “Let’s not 
corrupt the planning process” is a line often heard or determined. But as 
we have seen from the presentations on Denmark municipalities, local 
governments there are taking a key and active role in the enforcement 
of community benefits. We would like to argue here that Scotland could 
be more like Denmark when it comes to community benefits provisions. 
Scotland could certainly learn much from the interesting concepts and the 
approaches developed in Denmark and that were discussed as part of this 
conference.
Once more the real concern that arises as a result of our research is that 
there seems to be no joined up thinking in terms of local government. 
There seems to be a real lack of what I call “inter-governmental 
cooperation” and discussion when it comes to this issue. Why have local 
authorities and councils in Scotland not got together and determined 
what their policy should be on this issue? Some of the reasons highlighted 
in this contribution can explain why it might be difficult to do so. Yet, it 
certainly also has to do with a real lack of inter-governmental collaboration 
at the local level when it comes to this issue. So, where should community 
benefits provision lie when it comes to local authorities? Should it be 
dealt with by the planners? Due to the current framework of the law, the 
answer is probably not. It is therefore suggested that the law should be 
changed when it comes to community benefits provision. It might cause 
a degree of short term complexity in doing so, but it would be possible 
to change the basis on which legitimate planning conditions are based. 
Planners should integrate it, very much like what we have seen has been 
done in Denmark, Germany and some other countries. Changing the 
law would clarify where the responsibility lies in terms of who should 
be giving considerations for community benefits. Should this issue be 
discussed with the planners or, should it have to be discussed with 
economic development? From the various responses that we received in 
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the study, it is about 50-50. The planners responded positively in 50% of 
the cases, and so did economic development in terms of the other 50%.
Our closing statement will include that the Scottish government, at 
national and local levels, have been slow to respond to debates on 
community benefits provisions. We have indicated that the power is held 
by the developers at the moment. Currently, Scottish local authorities 
lack the robust frameworks required for managing community benefits 
provision, with the exception of some examples of very good practice. 
These examples of good practice should certainly not be discontinued 
as the Highlands Council, Argyll and Bute and some of the others, have 
been very proactive on this issue. Yet, our final recommendation is 
that there is an urgent need for some sort of national formal guidance 
on community benefits provisions. We would recommend seeing the 
planning law being changed to incorporate community benefits provision 
into the planning process. Until this or similar steps are taken, there will 
be a lack of trust when it comes to the interactions between corporate 
developers, local communities, local government - and between local 
government and the publics which they serve.
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